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REWRITING HISTORY: THE PROPRIE'I'Y 'OF 
ERADICATING PRIOR DECISI·ON.i\L LA .vV 
THROUGH SE1,T'LEMEN1' AND 
VACATUR 
jill E. Fisch t 
The power of courts to vacate their prior judgments is not a 
recent innovation. In the past several years, hmvever, courts have 
begun to embrace the practice of vacating judgments following a 
postjudgment s ettlement of the litigation.1 The practice appears to 
have its roots2 in the Second Circuit's decision in Nestle Co. v. 
Chester's Market, Inc. 3 While many practitioners seem una.ware of the 
availability of vacatur after judgment,4 the possibility of obtaining 
vacatur and the salutary effect of vacatur upon postjudgment settle­
ments is receiving increasing attention from the bar. 5 
-----------------·-------- -- - ----··-----
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1982, Cor­
nell University; J.D. 1985, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Debbie Batts, Lea 
Brilmayer, Geoffrey Hazard, Bruce Johnson, Michael Malloy, Mike Iv:\artin, Richard Pos­
ner, and Steve The! for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this Article and to 
Gary Leibowitz for his research assistance. In addition, I would like to thankjohn Cof­
fee for reminding me that civil procedure is too important to be left to proceduralists. 
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Llt1gation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CH!. L REv. 877 (1987). 
l This Article will focus on three "primary" cases representing the r.b:ree ap­
proaches recently employed by the Second, Seventh, and l'linth Circuits in ruling on 3 
motion to vacate: National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 :r.�d 76?. (9th Ci:r. 
1989); Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Heaith & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 1299 
(7th Cir. 1988); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985). 
2 Nestle appears to be the first modern decision in which a court concluded that a 
settling party was "entitled" to vacatur of an adverse trial court judgn1em. Prior to the 
Nestle decision, the rule in the Second Circuit seems to have been to the contrary. See 
Sampson v. Radio Corp. of Am., 434 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 19'70). 
3 7 56 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985). 
4 Informal discussions with the Second Circuit offici<�is in charge of the administ.ra­
tion of the Civil Appeal Management Program (CAlVIP) indicc.te that most practitioners 
are unaware of the Nestle decision and the possibility of :::voiding adverse effects of a triai 
court judgment through vacatur. It seems li!<ely that the recent attention focused on 
vacatur and its effects will result in an increased use of :motions ro vacat.e by litigant>. 
5 See Note, Settlement Pending Appeal: An Argument Fm· Va;:aiur, 58 FoRDHAM L. REV. 
'233 (1989) (authored by Henry E. Klingeman) [hereinafter No,�e, Seiib:ent Pending Ap­
peal]; Note, Avoiding issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned Upon the Vccalur cf Enlm:dju.dg­
ments, 96 YALE LJ 860 (1987) (authored by William D. Zeiler) [b:�n�inafte:r Note, 
Avoiding Issue Preclusion); Robert A. Barker. Ca!lateral Estof'pel- l'l'or.�ers' Compm::aiion. 
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1990, at 3. coL l; see also Note, The !m,uact of Co!ialem! Esioptlf'l Oil 
Postjudgrnent Seitlements, 15 Sw. U.L REv. 343 (1985) {authored b�i Ann J'd. Gkz<�rians) 
[hereinafter Note, The Impact of Collateral Esto/Jpel]. 
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One explanation for this attention is the increasing congestion 
of federal dockets, both a t  the trial and the appellate levels, which 
has led courts to search for new wavs to resolve disoutes and reduce I l 
the system's caseload.6 The Nestle court and most commentators 
view vacatur after settlement as a useful tool in encouraging settle­
ments and reducing appellate caseloads.7 
6 A number of proposals have given rise to d iscussion, experimentation, and pro­
cedural reform in an attempt to reduce the docket congestion of the federal courts. See, 
e.g., Alan Betten, Institutional Reform in the Federal Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63 ( 1976) (screening 
procedures, use of per curiam opinions, adding judgeships or circuits) ; Irving R. Kauf­
man, The Pre-Argument Conference: A n  Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 094 
( 1 974) (experimental program of preargument conferences designed to encourage set­
tlement and narrow issues on appeal) [hereinafter Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference]; 
Richard A. Posner, The Summary jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
Some Cautionary Observances, 5 3  U. CHI. L. REv. 366 ( 1 986) ( the summary j ury trial as an 
alternative to conventional l itigat ion) ; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The 
Non-Precedential Precedent-Lzmited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts 
of Appeals, 78 CoLUM. L. REv . 1 1 67 ( 1 978) (reducing opinion-writing through the use of 
unpublished or l imited publication opinions ) .  The most highly publicized experimenta­
tion has been in the area of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). See Posner, supra, at 
366 n .2  (citing ADR literature). 
A significant procedural reform at  the appellate level is ti:e use of preargument 
conferences to encourage settlement of cases pending appeal. The Second Circuit has 
created a program known as the Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP) in which liti­
gants must participate in a pre-argument conference with staff counsel who play an af­
firmative role in encouraging set tlement. See Irving R. Kaufman, A1ust Every Ap,bea! Run 
the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals lvlan agemenl  Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 758 (1986) [hereinafter 
Kaufman, A!ust Every Appeal Run the Gamut?]. The Second Circuit claims that its CAMP 
program has increased the number of cases which are settled pending appeal. See id. at 
761; Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judinal Reform: Time as the 
Greatest Innovator, 57 FoRDHAM L. REv. 253, 261-64 ( 1988) ;  Kaufman, Tht Pre-.4rgument 
Conference, supra, at I 098- 1 102 . That conclusion has been strongly criticized by at least 
one commentator, who claims that empirical evidence demonstrates that the CAMP pro­
gram does not have a s tatistically significant effect on settlement . See jERRY GoLDMAN, 
INEFFECTIVE JusTICE: EvALUATING THE PREAPPEAL CoNFERENCE ( 1980). 
The Second Circui t 's  program has lead to experirnentation in other Circuits. Hoth 
the S ixth and the Eighth Circui ts have adopted programs modeled on :=_�ii.lviP, which are 
designed to increase the efficiency of the appellate process. Both pwgrams i11clude as 
an obj ective the encouragement of settlement .  See Donald P. Lay, A Blueprint for judicial 
J'vfanagement, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 104 7 ,  1063 (1984) (Eighth Circuit program involves 
"attempting to bring the lawyers together and having them meet at an early stage of the 
appellate process in order to try to effect a settlement'"); Robert W. Rack, Jr., Pre-.·hgu­
ment Conferences in the Sixth Circuit Court cJA/Jf'ea!s, 15 U. Tot.. L. ::;�E\1. 921 (1984). The 
Seventh Circuit experimented \Nith a preappeal program from 1978 to l 983. The pro­
gram was found to have no significant effect on the rate of settlemenr of <lppe<.>.ls. See 
.JERRY GOLDMAN , THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PREA?PEAL PROGRAM: AN EVA.U.HTlON {�.3 ( 1982). 
The Seventh Circuit subsequently discontinued its ;)rogTam. See Kaufman, /\lu.s! Euny 
.4ppeal Run the Gamut?, supra, at 762 n.34. The Ninth Circuit has 2 prebrieSrcg conference 
program, but its program is designed for the purpose of case management.. not •:·nc<Jur­
aging settlement. See joE S. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION or- JusTICE IN A LL:ZGZ APPELLATE 
CouRT: THE NINTH CrRcun INNOVATIONS PROJECTS 81-82 (1985}. 
7 See Note, Setilement Pending A,bpeal, supra note 5, a!. 235-36 (obs::rving th'': dEmntic 
increase in docket congestion in the federal courts and the responses bv ,)->,� ieg2I com­
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Although the courts recogni ze vacatur's  salutary effect on set­
tlement, they remain cognizant that vacatur has its drawbacks . The 
benefits that vacatur may present to a losing litigant are partially 
offset by the detriments that erasing a valid j udgment may have on 
third parties or the public as a whole. When considering a motion 
to vacate made in the context of a postj udgment settlement, the 
courts have framed the analysis in terms of balancing the interests of 
the public in the finality of judgments against the interests of p rivate 
litigaDts in ending the litigation through settlement .8 Two p ercep­
tions underlie the public interest  in finality of judgments: the belief 
that finality increas es the efficiency of the j udicial system by acting as 
a bar to relitigation of the same and similar claims and issues, and 
the opinio n  that finality increases the integrity of the sys tem by 
maintaining !"espect for the judicial process .9 On the other hand, 
proponents of vacatur argue that the function of litigation is the res­
olution of private disputes ,  and no public interes t can outweigh the 
private interests of the litigants in resolving their dispute. 1 0 More­
over, the proponents argue that litigants should be entitled to abso­
lute control over the manner in which their dispute is resolved; 1 1 a 
decision denying the parties ' reques t for vacatur is thus an imper­
missible j udicial interference with this right . 1 2 
catur is frequently viewed as an important tool for encouraging parties to settle pending 
appeal . See id. 
8 To the extent that settlement has the effect of reducing docket congestion and 
resolving cases without further consumption of judicial resources, i t  obviously serves 
public as well as private interests .  "Refusal to vacate may force parties to continue an 
appeal, at cost to themselves, their adversaries, the overburdened appellate courts and. 
by extension, the public. " Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5,  at 236 .  ADR 
advocates claim that settlement is preferable to ful l  adjudication because resolution of 
disputes through settlement conserves judicial resources. With programs such as 
CAMP, the courts appear to espouse that view. For a critique of the proposition that 
settlement is, in generic terms, preferable to judgment, see Owen M. Fiss , Against Se!tle­
ment, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
9 For the last hundred years the Supreme Court has followed a course s tressing 
the importance of finality .  See, e.g . , Southern Pac. R .R. v .  Uni ted S tates , 1 68 U .S .  1 ,  49 
(1897) ("[T]he aid ofjudicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights 
of person and property, if . . .  conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such 
tribunals . . . .  " ) .  The Court's interest in promoting finality of judgments is most re­
cently evidenced by its e. ·pansion of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
See infra notes I 15-38 and accompanying text. 
10 See, e.g., N�stle, 756 F.2d at 282-83; Federal Data Corp . v. SMS Data ·Prods. 
Group, Inc . ,  819 F.2d 277, 279-80 (Fed . Cir. 1987 ) .  
I l This model of  litigation, in which the individual choices o f  the l it igants reign 
supreme, is often refer;:-ed to as the traditional model of l i t igation .  See Abram Chayes. 
The Role of the judge In Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1282-83 (1976) 
(describing typical attributes of the traditional model). The prime importance of indi­
vidual litigants suggests that the model is really one of individual autonomy. Set! John E. 
Kennedy, Digging for the A!issing Lmk (Book Review) , 41 VAND. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93 
(1988) . 
12 S?e l 3A CHARLES AL;N WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. CooPER, FED-
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Recent decisions in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits re­
flect three wholly different results in the balance of interests. The 
Second Circuit approach, reflected in the Nestle decision, accepts the 
importance of encouraging settlement and, accordingly, adopts a 
rule of law in which s ettling litigants are entitled to vacatur of the 
trial court's judgment virtually as a matter of right. The Seventh 
Circuit concludes that the public interest in the finality ofjudgments 
outweighs the parties' private interes ts and determines that motions 
to vacate should generally be denied.13 The Ninth Circuit adopts a 
case-by-case balancing approach in which the courts consider the 
implications of the analysis on the specific facts of a particular 
case.14 
This Article presents the basic question of whether and under 
what circums tances a court should grant the parties' motion to va­
cate when a cas e is settled after a final judgment. The Article will 
firs t examine in detail the approaches espoused by the Second, Sev­
enth, and Ninth Circuits. Second, it will consider the consequences 
o f  vacatur, both upon the parties to the litigation and o thers. Third, 
using an economic approach, it will assess the impact of vacatur on 
the settlement urocess , and will conclude bv considering the aues-i ) '-.J J. 
tion of whether postjudgment vacatur truly encourages s ettlement 
and if so,  at what cos t. IS 
The Article reaches the conclusion that, while a decision such as 
Nestle has the result of expediting the termination of litigation in a 
particular case, a rule of law which routinely permits pos t--settlement 
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10, at 432 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter WRIGHT, 
MILLER & CooPER] ("The parties should remain free to settle on terms that require 
vacation of the judgment, entry of a new consent judgment, or such other action as fits 
their needs."). 
13 See A1emorial Hasp., 862 F.2d at 1299. 
14 See National Union, 891 F.2d at 762. 
15 A true advocate of the structuralist approach to litigation, such as Professor Fiss, 
would further criticize postsettlement vacatur by arguing that the encouragement of set­
tlemenc of cases pending appeal is not a desirable goal. See Owen lvL Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 
YALE LJ. 1669 (1985) [hereinafter Fiss, Out of Eden]; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 
1978 Term-Forward: The Forms of justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (l979) [hereinafter Fiss, The 
Supreme Court]; Fiss, supra note 8. Professor Fiss argues that settlement fur�hers neither 
the private goals of the litigants nor the public goals of society in the adjudicative pro­
cess. Moreover, Fiss replies to those who commend settlement for its conservation of 
judicial resources that settlement does not actually resolve disputes; rather, it is merely a 
truce. See Fiss, Out of Eden, supra, at 1670. As such, it is "a highly problematic technique 
for streamlining dockets." Fiss, supra note 8, at 1 07Ei. Professor Fiss may somewhat 
overstate his case. Presumably rational litigants would not settle cases uniess settiement 
served their private goals, at !east to some extent. Moreover, it is readily apparent that 
settlement serves the public goal of maintaining the judicial system's capacity to resolve 
disputes. If no cases were .,ettled, the courts would surely collapse. A detailed explora­
tion of the merits of resolving litigation by settlement is beyond the scope of this Article, 
which is limited to the effect of vacatur on the settlement procesc;. 
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vacatur of judgments actually distorts the settlement process. Such 
a rule may encourage litigants to delay settlement until a later s tage 
in the litigation. This delay results in a waste of j udicial resources .  
Further, the effect of vacatur on the litigation process extends be­
yond j udicial waste; it perverts the judicial decision into a negotiable 
commodity, engendering dis tortion of, and disrespect for ,  the role 
of the courts . 
I 
THE MoTION To VACATE 
A. The Decision of the Litigants to Vacate : Settlement of 
Cases  After Judgment 
Following an adverse judgment at the trial level , an unsuccess­
ful l itigant incurs real economic costs-the costs  of complying with 
the imposed remedy. 1 6 That remedy may require the losing p arty to 
p ay money damages , comply with an inj unction, or alter his  or her 
conduct pursuant to the court's declaration of the parties '  legal 
rights . The losing litigant may also incur costs which extend beyond 
the judgment itself, costs which will  be referred to as " collateral 
costs . "  17 Collateral costs may include the adverse publicity engen­
dered by the decision, damage to reputation, 1 8 and the spawning o f  
parasite lawsuits , such a s  copycat o r  class action claims . Moreover, 
the court's  findings of fact and law may themselves have a life be­
yond the instant case which creates additional costs. Modern doc­
trines of claim and issue preclusion have expanded the use o f  
judicial findings i n  subsequent litigation against the losing party . 19 
1 6 Or, in the case of a losing plaintiff, the cost of not obtaining the remedy sought .  
I 7 The notion that an adverse judgment may have collateral consequences which 
extend beyond the ad damnum is not original to this Article. Indeed, the collateral conse­
quences of criminal cases have given rise to a doctrine which provides that such cases 
will not be deemed moot even after the defendant has served the entire sentence, i n  
order that the case may b e  reviewed o n  appeal. Under the doctrine, the defendant ,  i f  
successful,  may be relieved of the collateral consequences of the conviction .  See Sibron 
v .  New York, 392 U.S .  40, 50-58 ( 1 968) (noting collateral consequences o f  an  adverse 
criminal judgment including future sentence enhancement and impeachment) . 
1 8 Indeed, an adverse decision in a civil securities l i tigation may require the litigant 
to disclose the adverse judgment to the SEC and the public.  See, e.g., Ins tructions to 
SEC Schedule !3D, Item 2(e) , 1 7  C .F .R.  § §  240. 1 3d-l0 1 ( 1 990) (requiring reportin g  of 
whether the filer is subject to a judgment enjoining future violations or finding any viola­
tion with respect to federal or s tate securities laws) . 
19 See Blonder-Tongue Labs . ,  Inc. v. University of Ill. Found. ,  402 U.S .  3 1 3 , 3 1 7 - 2 7  
(19 7 1 )  (tracing expansion and development of  preclusion doctrines) .  In  Bernhard v .  
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association, 1 9  Cal .  2d 8 0 7 ,  122 P . 2 d  892 
( 1942) ,  the California Supreme Court repudiated the traditional requirement thai issue 
preclusion involve only the parties to the original lawsuit. The Bemhard decision to abol­
ish the requirement of mutuality was widely followed, although not until relatively re­
cently. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v .  Shore, 439 U.S .  322 ( 1 979) ; Brainerd Currie , 
Mutuahty of Collateral Estoppel. Limits of the Bernhard Doct1-ine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957) . 
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The collateral costs of a judgment may be subs tantially greater for 
the losing party than the immediate cos ts of complying with the 
j udgment .  20 
Faced with the prospect of incurring such costs , the unsuccess­
ful litigant has three options: to comply with the j udgment, to ap­
peal, or t o  negotiate a settlement with his or her adversary. The 
expected legal and economic consequences of each option are likely 
to influence the litigant's choice. 21 
A litigant who complies with the adverse judgment must bear 
the above-described cos ts of the j udgment in full. In addition, com­
pliance with the j u dgment terminates the litigation by effectively 
mooting the controversy. A complying litigant thereby forgoes any 
right to appeal.22 
A litigant who success fully appeals may avoid any liability to the 
o ther side. The terms of the trial court judgment may, however, 
make a successful appeal unlikely. For example, appeal of a judg­
ment b ased solely on unreviewable findings of fact23 is likely to be 
20 For example, the judgment in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), an early asbestos case, was 
for $58,534,04 in damages. !d. at 1102. (The jury verdict was for $68,000, which was 
adjusted, probably to account for prejudgment interest and amounts received from set­
tling defendants. See Michael D .  Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill 
Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L REv. 141, 171 n.179 
(1984)). Many subsequent asbestos litigants have attempted to use the Borel opinion to 
collaterally estop defendants from denying that asbestos is an unreasonably dangerous 
product. See Green, supra, at 172-78. These subs equent cas-":s have cost defendants bil­
lions of dollars in compensation and litigation expenses. M at 171. Thus, for future 
asbestos defendants, the cost of the Borel judgment may extend far beyond the $58,000 
money damages. 
2 l Scholars have long accepted that parties base litigation decisions on the expected 
economic consequences of those decisions. Professor Gould, Landes, and Posner have 
analyzed the decision to litigate or settle a civil lawsuit in terms of an investment deci­
sion, in which the litigant weighs continued participation in the litigation in terms of the 
exp.-::cted value to be obtained by such participation against the costs of continuing to 
litigate, See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, '2 J LEGAL STUD, 279 (1973); 
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 JL & EcoN. 61 (1971); Richard 
Posner, An Economzc Approach to Legal Procedure and judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
399 (1973). Subsequent commentators have attempted to refine the model of the "liti­
gation investment" in order to reflect more accurately che decisionmaking during the 
ongoing litigation process. See, e.g., Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue_· An Option­
Pricmg Approach, 19 J LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990). For an application of the economic "liti­
gation investment" model to the settlement of cases after judgment, see infra notes 220-
31 and accompanying text. 
22 A party's compliance with the adverse judgment will render the action moot. See, 
e.g,, United States v. Garde, 848 F.2d 1307, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
23 In general, findings of fact by a trial court may only be reversed by an appellate 
court on the conclusion that such findings are clearly erroneous. See FED, R. CIV, P. 
52(a); see aLm Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, '286 n.l6 (1982) (condemning 
appellate court practice of subjecting trial court factfinding to more extensive scrutiny 
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futile . 24 In addition, the appellate process is  s tatistically unlikely to 
result in reversal ; records from the federal courts reveal that most  
judgments are upheld on appeal .25 Moreover, the decision of the 
trial court, by demonstrating the court's p erception of the applica­
ble law and the application of that law to the facts,  may bring h ome 
to the unsuccessful litigant the lack of legal merit in his or her legal 
position . 
Such factors often lead to the third available option :  settle­
ment. Parties settle a large number of cases during the appellate 
process and prior to the completion of appellate review.26 Though 
the loser is unlikely to escape all costs of  the judgment by s ettle­
ment,  the costs of settlement are unlikely to exceed those of comply­
ing with the j udgment. And by offering the winner a swifter and 
more certain route to payment than the appellate proces s ,  a losing 
litigant may be able to negotiate a considerable savings through 
postj udgment settlement. 27  
The settlement process offers the losing litigant an additional 
benefit .  If the losing party is  concerned about the collateral conse­
quences of the adverse j udgment, h e  or  she may incorporate certain 
conditions into the settlement agreement to deal with those conse­
quences . These conditions may include dismissing the action predi­
cated on a consent agreement disclaiming liability, limiting the 
cently expounded on what is meant by "clearly erroneous" i n  Anderson v .  C i ty of Besse­
mer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76 ( 1 984). 
24 Cf Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision l'vlaking A uthority Between the Trial  
and Appella te Levels: A Umfied View of the Scope of Review, the judge/jury Question, and Proce­
dural Discretion ,  64 N . C . L .  REv. 993 ( 1 986). 
25 See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking The Right to Appeal (More or Less) SerioU5ly , 95 YALE 
L.J. 62, 78 (1985) (appellate courts affirm more often than they revers e) . Studies of the 
case s tat is t ics in  federal courts of appeals indicate that the typical overall revers<:�! rate is 
less than 20 % .  See, e.g. , DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CouRTS , ANNUAL RE­
PORT app. I ,  De/ailed Statistzcal Tables , at  1 0, table B-5 (june 30, 1 989) (overall percentage 
of cases reversed by federal Courts of Appeals was 1 3.3% ;  percentage of private civil 
cases reversed was 1 6 . 1  % ) ;  ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U .S .  COURTS,  fEDERAL 
CouRT lVIANAGEMENT STATISTICS ( 1 984) (showing overall reversal  rates in the Uni ted 
S tates Courts of Appeals during the period 1979 through 1 984 as ranging between 
1 5.9 % and 1 7.7%);  sec also Note, Courting Reversal: The Supenmmy Role of State Supreme 
Courts , 87 YALE LJ .  1 1 9 1 ,  1 1 98 n.30 ( 1 978) (authored by Margaret P .P. M ason) (citing 
empirical study of 1 6  state supreme courts for the period 1 87 0- 1 97 0  and concluding 
that the aggregate reversal rate was 38.5% ) .  
26 See Peter !--1 . Schuck, The Role of judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange 
Example, 5 3  U .  C m .  L.  REv. 337 ( 1986) (the fai lure to reach settlement is frequemly 
based on parties'  inability to assess the legal meri ts of their position) . 
'2 7  Like simpie compliance, settlement renders a case moot.  Under s uch circum­
s tance s ,  " the trial court ' 3  determinations ought to have the same conclusive effect that 
they would have if  the appellant had n o t  appealed at all . "  Garde, 848 F.2d a t  1 3 1 0  n . 7 .  
This Article questions wheher, i n  the context of a settlemen t ,  t h e  lower court's opinion 
should be treated differently than when a party simply pays the judgment without 
appealin g. 
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collateral use  of the adverse j u d gm ent inter se , or b etween the par­
ties ,  or stipulating that the p arties  will request the court to vacate 
the adverse judgment.  
Vacatur is  p otentially the m o st p owerful of these options .  Vaca­
tur enables an unsuccessful  litigant to obtain the collateral benefits 
of reversal,  such as removal of the decision from the record books 
and destruction of any collateral estoppel or res j u dicata conse­
quence s ,  in exchange for the s ettlement price . 28 In e ffect, if a liti­
gant is certain that the court will subsequently vacate an adverse 
judgment, the availability of vacatur makes going to trial cost-free,29 
apart from litigation costs . 30 A litigant may roll the dice, gamble on 
a favorable j ud gment and,  if unsuccessful at trial,  s ettle the case af­
ter j udgment and move for vacatur. After settlement and vacatur of 
the trial court decision,  the litigant will be no worse off than if he or 
she had avoided a final j udgment by enterin g  into a pretrial 
settlement. 
B. The Authority of C ourts to Vacate Judgments 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the federal 
courts ,3 1 at  both the trial and appellate levels ,  with explicit authority 
to modify p rior judgm ents . An example of such authority is found 
in Rule 60(b) ,32 which permits a court to relieve a p arty from an 
adverse j udgment on grounds which include frau d ,  mistake, newly 
discovered evidence,  and s atisfaction of the j udgment . 33 
28 In a strict sense vacatur may refer to removal of  the adverse judgment, with­
drawal of the court's opinion, or both. The consequences of vacating only the adverse 
j udgment are more limited . Though a vacated judgment has no preclusive effect, see 
infra notes 144- 45 and accompanying text ,  the court's opinion may sti l l  be used to guide 
the decisions of subsequent courts . This distinction is  particularly important when con­
sidering the vacatur of  appellate court decis ions .  
29 This assertion is  based on the assumption that an unsuccessful l i tigant will have 
to pay compensation costs whether he settles or  l it igates . Obviously a trial court j udg­
ment may change the figure for which the l itigant will be able to settle-that figure may 
be higher or lower than the other side's original settlement demands, depending on 
whether that party's original estimate of the expected j udgment was accurate. See infra 
notes 229-31 and accompanying text. 
30 The additional litigation costs incurred by postponing settlement until after a 
tria! court judgment may, of  course, be considerable, particularly if that judgment is  
based on a full j ury trial verdict .  
3 1 This Article will focus on  the procedures in the federal courts .  Although the 
policies and purposes of motions to vacate are the same in the state systems, the applica­
ble procedures may vary. 
32 Rule 60 (b) permits a court to relieve a party from a final j udgment, order, or 
proceeding on  motion and upon such terms as are just ,  for a series of enumerated rea­
sons.  The Rule also includes a catch-all provision which allows relief from a judgment 
for "any o ther reason justifying relief from the operation of the j udgment. " FED. R .  Civ. 
P.  60(b) . 
33 A litigant may also bring a motion to vacate under Rule 59 (e) which permits 
motions to alter or amend a judgment. See, e.g. , Wisconsin Truck Center, Inc. v .  Volvo 
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Vacatur requires an affirmative action by the court-dismis sal 
or abandonment of a case does not automatically vacate the j udg­
ment therein .34 If a case undergoes appellate review or if the litiga­
tion is  s imply discontinued , the prior judgment continues to exis t  
a n d  t o  have full  force and effect .35 By contrast ,  a vacated decision 
has no further force and effect;36 rather, vacatur operates to erase 
the prior decision and requires affirmative j udicial action. 
While cases may be vacated for a variety of reasons, this Article 
is  concerned only with motions to vacate made in connection with 
the postj udgment settlement of an action. In the type of action to 
which this Article is addressed,  the case has been litigated at the trial 
court level to the point of a finaP7 decision38 and the entry of j udg-
White Truck Corp . ,  692 F. Supp. 1 0  I 0 (W. D .  Wis .  1 988) (motion to vacate based on 
constitutional and other objections to judgment brought under FED. R .  Crv. P.  59(e) ) .  
Additionally, 2 8  U.S .C .  § 2 1 06 ( 1 988) , which applies to both the Circuit  Courts of 
Appeal and the United States Supreme Court, provides: 
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may af­
firm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any j udgment,  decree, or order 
of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the 
cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment ,  decree, or or­
der, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under 
the circumstances. 
34 See, e.g. , SuP.  CT. R.  53 (when a case before the court is settled, i t  is dismissed, 
but not vacated ) .  Although vacatur requires court action, dismissal of a lawsuit may 
generally be accomplished without the action of the court. See, e.g. , FED.  R.  Crv. P. 
4 1  (a) ( l) (an action may be dismissed without order of the court by the filing of a s tipula­
tion of dismissal s igned by all parties who have appeared in the action) . 
3 5 See l B jAMES WM. MooR£, jo DESHA LucAs & THOMAS S .  Cu RRICK , MooRE's  FED­
ERAL PRACTICE � 0.4 1 6 [3 ]  (2d ed. 1 988) (hereinafter MOORE'S fEDERAL PRACTICE] (a final 
judgment retains its preclusive effect regardless of the possibility or pendency of an 
appeal) .  
36 See, e.g . , Chandler v. System Council U- 1 9, No. CV85-AR- l 948-s, s l ip op.  at 4 
(N.D .  Ala .  Oct .  20, 1 986) (LEXIS ,  Genfed library, Dist file) ("A decision which is vacz.ted 
has no preceden tial value, and for al l  intents and purposes never exis ted . " ) .  
3 7 Pending cases are aiso frequently settled after a variety of preliminary decisions 
by the district court. These interim decisions may take the form of a partial grant of 
summary judgment,  a grant of interim relief in the form of a preliminary injunction, or a 
d ismissal of some po rt ion of the pending claims. Like final judgments,  these preliminary 
decisions may involve findings of fact  and/or findings of law. Similarly ,  li tigants fre­
quently make analogous motions in these cases, requesting that the district court judge 
vacate his or her prior decision(s) . See, e. g . , United States v. Gordon, 1 98 7  Ct .  Int i .  
Trade LEXIS 3 1  ( 1 987) .  Although a compelling argument can be made for the claim 
that such preliminary decis ions lack the intended permanence of final judgments and 
should be routinely vacated, this Article asserts that interim decisions can be subjected 
to the same analysis , and treated the same way, as final judgments. Moreover, the prac­
tice of routinely granting " (r]equests to vacate interlocutory opinions and orders in d is ­
missed cases invite [s J  a waste ofjudicial resources ." !d. , 1 987 Ct .  Inti . Trade LEXIS at 3 
(refusing to vacate decision and order which did not const itute final judgment ) .  
38 A finai j udgment may b e  based on a decision by  j udge or jury at tria l ,  t h e  grant o f  
a motion for summary judgment, or  a �uccessful motion t o  dismiss (e. g . .  dismissal based 
on a judicial finding that the court lacks personal j urisd iction over the defendan t ) .  The 
decision upon which the judgment is bc sed may hC\ve required the court or jury to make 
findings of fact ,  findings of law, o r  both. 
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ment. Typically one or both parties h ave filed a notice o f  appeal , 
thereby initiating the process of appellate review. 39 Prior to com­
p letion of the appellate proces s ,  however, the p arties m ay negotiate 
a settlement which obviates the need for further liti gation .  
Pos tjudgment settlement necessarily entails dismissal o f  the 
pending appeal (s)  .40 A settlement does not mandate vacatur, how­
ever. Indeed, the vast maj ority of cases s ettled pending appeal do 
not result in vacatur of the trial court' s  judgment .  Although the par­
ties may explicitly address the issue of vacatur in the settlement 
agreement,4 1 they need not do so in order to move for vacatur.42 
The motion to vacate,  in the first instance , is m o s t  commonly 
39 Although the parties need not have initiated the appellate process, only a settle­
ment effected prior to the final date upon which the losing party can challenge the judg­
ment, either by a motion directed to the trial court or by appeal, raises the issue of 
vacatur. Once a party' s  t ime to appeal has run, there is no jus tification for vacatur­
settlement at that point in the l i tigation is equivalent to simple compliance with the 
j udgment .  See supra note 27 .  
40 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 2 (a) provides that ,  i f  a n  appeal has not  yet 
been docketed, the case may be dismissed by the dis trict court " upon the filing in  that 
court of a stipulation for dismissal signed by al l  the parties, or upon motion and notice 
by the appellant . "  FED. R. APP. P. 42 (a) . If the appeal has been docketed, the parties 
thereto can have the case dismissed under Rule 4 2(b) by fil ing a s tipulation of dismissal 
with the clerk. Even if the parties do n o t  so st ipulate,  the acceptance by both parties of 
the settlement renders the action moot,  and an appellate court will  not  retain jurisdic­
rion. See, e.g. , United States v.  Garde, 848 F.2d 1 307,  1 307 (D.C.  Cir .  1 988) ; cj. Village 
Escrow Co.  v .  National Union Fire Ins . ,  202 Cal . App. 3d 1 309, 248 Cal. Rptr. 687, 694 
( 1 988) (refusing to dismiss appeal settled after oral argument because of the great im­
portance of the issue presented and the t iming and nature of the set tlement) . The Cali­
fornia Supreme Court, in denying review of Village Escrow, "ordered that the opinion be 
not officially published . "  !d. , 248 Cal. Rptr. a t  687 n .  �' . 
4 1  When negotiating the issue of vacatur, the parties have s everai options .  The 
most s tringent condition that may be imposed by the losing party for the settlement to 
become effective is that the judgment be vacated. In o ther words, the losing party only 
agrees to a settlement conditioned on the court ' s  grant of the subsequ en t motion to 
vacate. Alternatively ,  the settlement agreement, though not conditioned on vacatur, 
may require that the winning party join in the motion to vacate.  Final ly ,  the agreement 
may simply require that the winning l i tigant agree not to oppose the loser's motion to 
vacate the judgment. 
Distinguishing between these options has some superficial appeal for comts s trug­
gling with the propriety of vacatur. A set tlem ent conditioned on ,,acatur, for example, 
will be thwarted by denial of the motion to vacate, wh ereas an unconditional settlement 
will remain in  effect .  The agreement by both parties to join in the motion to vacate may 
affect the mootness analysis .  Cf National Union Fire Ins. Co. v .  Seafirs t Corp . ,  89 1 F .2d 
762,  767 ( 9 t h  Cir. 1 989) (rejecting unilateral/bi lateral distinction) . This Article argues 
that judicial consideration of these three scenarios should be identical .  See znfra notes 
24 3 - 46 and accompanying text .  
4 2 The motion to vacate may be made jointly ,  or  by the losing party with the win ­
n i n g  party failing to object .  A nonparty, h owever, cannot maint,lin a motion to vacate a 
judgmi':n t .  See, e.g. , Citibank int ' l  v. Collier-Traino,  Inc. ,  809 F . 2 d  1438 ,  l '-}40- 4 1  (9th 
Cir. 1 987) (analogizing to a nonparty's attempt to appeal from a trial court judgment 
-:;nd applying similar standards to motions by a nonparty to vacJte) . 
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made to the appellate court,43 because once the notice of appeal has 
been filed, the trial court is divested of j urisdiction.44 If the appeal 
has not yet been filed, the motion to vacate may be made directly to 
the lower court .45 The Second Circuit has suggested that even in 
cases in which an appeal has been filed, it  is appropriate for the dis­
trict court to consider the motion to vacate first .46 Vvhichever court 
considers the motion must decide the propriety of erasing a prior 
judicial decision . 
II 
JumciAL CoNSIDERATIO N  OF THE MoTION TO VACATE 
There is no direct s tatutory test governing the court ' s  authority 
to vacate a prior judgment. Although the power of a court to vacate 
a prior j udgment is not explicit,47 courts undisputably possess such 
power, and the decision to vacate is a matter of j udicial discretion.48 
Moreover, the case law interpreting Rule 60(b) suggests that court 
dis cretion in this area is quite broad .49 
In the firs t cases to address the issue of pos tsettlement motions 
to vacate, litigants attempted to argue that vacatur of a j udgment 
43 See National Union, 89 1 F.2d at 765 ("The question of vacatur usually arises on 
motion to the appellate court, made after a settlement, pending appeal."). 
44 Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,  459 U .S. 56, 58 ( 1 982) (per curiam) 
("The fil ing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance--it confers 
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of i ts  control over those 
aspects of the case involved in the appeal."). 
45 See, e.g. ,  National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp ., No.  C85-396R (W. D. 
Wash. 1 987). 
45 See Nestle Co. v .  Chester's Mkt., Inc . ,  756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985) . The appellate 
court can return jurisdiction to the iower court by dismissing the appeal with out preju­
dice. Su ch a practice seems eminentlv desirable. It is entirely appropriate for the court 
which entered the underlying judgment to consider the motion to vacate because that 
trib unal is most familiar with the relevant factors, including the parties involved, the 
consequeEces of retaining the judgment, and whether the parties have had a full oppor­
tunity to litigate the issues. 
4 7  Compare Nestle Co. v .  Chester ' s 1'-l!kt . ,  Inc., 596 F.  Supp. 1 445, 1 449 (D.  Conn. 
1 984)  (motion for vacatur after settlement properly brought under FED. R .  Crv.  P. 
60(b ) (5) or (6) ) ,  rez • 'd on  other grounds ,  756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1 985)  with Federal Data 
C'_)rp . v .  SMS Data Prods . Group , Inc . ,  8 1 9  F.2d 277, 279 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (brought as 
joint motion for dismissal conditioned on vacatur). 
4 8  See National Union , 89 1 F.2d a t  765 (" [W]e review for  abuse of discretion . " ); Me­
morial Hosp . v .  United S ta tes Dep't of Health & Human Servs . ,  862 F .2d 1 299, 1 302 
( '7 th Cir .  1 988) (in reviewin g  motion to vacate, court must " ensure that the agreement is 
an 2.ppropriate commitment ofjudici<ll time and complies with legal norms " ) ;  Nest!r, 756 
F.'2c c: t  232 ("Our inquiry . . .  is  limited to whether the distri n  court abused i ts 
discr.::: t ion ' ' ) . 
49 See 595 F . .Supp . at 1 449-50;  see also Klapprott v. Uni ted States ,  3 3 5  U . S .  
60 J. ,  S l 4- l 5  ( 1 949) ( " I n  simple English,  t h e  language of t h e  " o ther reason" clause [FED .  
R .  CP/.  P .  60(b) (6) ] ,  for a l l  reasons except the fi v e  particularly specified, vests  po wer in  
c o u rts adequate t o  enable them t o  vacate j udgments whenever s u c h  a n i o n  is  appropri­
c< te to accomplish just ice . " ) .  
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after s ettlement is mandatory .50 The argument was that the settle­
ment of the action renders the case moot.5 1 Under the doctrine of 
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. , 52 the litigants argued that a court is  
required to vacate a case which has been mooted prior to comple­
tion of the appellate proces s .  53 
In A1unsingvJear, the United States asked the Supreme Court to 
hold that the doctrine of res j udicata did not apply to a s econd suit 
between the United States and Munsingwear. The first action by the 
United States, alleging violations of a price-fixin g  regulation, had 
b een litigated with respect to inj unctive relief only. Following a 
j udgment that Munsingwear's pricing had complied with the regula­
tion, the commodity involved was deregulated .  Munsingwear 
m oved for dismissal on the basis of mootness ,  and the court of ap­
peals dismissed the appeal on that ground without vacating the 
j udgment. The United States then initiated a second lawsuit, cover­
ing a later time period,  seeking treble damages . Munsingwear 
moved to dismiss ,  based on the res j udicata effect of the first action. 
The United States argued that, since the first case had become moot 
prior to appeal , the doctrine of res j udicata should not apply. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. The C ourt noted that where a 
party is prevented from obtaining appellate review through no fault 
of its own, it has been unfairly prej udiced, and res j udicata should 
n o t apply. Indeed, the C ourt referred to its regular practice of va­
cating judgments in cases which become moot on their way to the 
Supreme Court. 54 But the C ourt, finding that the United States ac­
quiesced in the dismissal of the initial action when it should have 
a ttempted to preserve its rights by moving for vacatur, held that 
" having slept on its rights , " 55 the United S tates could not complain 
that i t  was now prej udiced by the application of res j udicata. 
Afunsingwear teaches that when a case is m ooted through no 
fault of the parties,  56 the maintenance of the judgment m ay be prej -
-----------------------------------
50 See, e.g. , National Union, 89 1 F .2d at 765; Nestle, 756 F .2d at 28 1 ;  Rings by Truck 
Lines, Inc.  v. 1/v'estern Conference of Teamsters , 686 F.2d 720,  72 1 -2 2  (9th Cir. 1 982) .  
5 \  See cases cited supra note 50. 
52 340 tJ .S .  36 ( 1 950) . 
5 3  See Great Western Sugar Co.  v .  Nelson, 442 U .S .  92, 93 ( 1 979) ; Duke Power C o .  
v .  Greenwood County, 299 U.S .  259 ,  267 ( 1 93 6 ) .  
5-'i According to the i\1/unsingwear Court: 
The es tablished practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a 
court in the federal system which has become moot while on i ts way here 
o r  pending our decision on the merits is  to reverse or vacate the j udg-­
iT!t:i.1t below and remand with a direction to dismiss .  
l'"-lu-,Isuzgruea:t, 340 U.S .  at 39 .  
55 !d. at 4 l .  
'.> 6  Ti1 ::- Nes!le court s tated that the A!ummgu,ear ru l e  provides that " dis trict court 
_j ; <dg,·;:.ents thai become moot pending appeal must  be vacated . ' '  Nestle, 756 F.2d at 2 8 1 .  
Tbi,; rea d i n g  of ;lfunsing-uJNZT is far too broad. 
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udicial to a party who has lost  the opportunity to challenge such a 
judgmen t on appeal . In such circumstances, " the j udgment in a 
moot case should be vacated to relieve the parties of collateral con­
s equences when they were unable to obtain appellate review. "57 
The justification for this holding is the reluctance of the Court to 
bind a party based on a prior judgment when that party has been 
foreclosed from challenging that j ud gment on appeal . 58 Thus ,  the 
Munsingwear doctrine "clears the path for future relitigation of the 
issues between the parties and eliminates a j udgment, review of 
which was prevented through happens tance. "59 
Virtually all courts have refused to apply the Munsingwear doc­
trine to cases which have been settled.60 According to the courts, 
!vfunsing-UJem· does not apply to a voluntary decision to terminate the 
litigation but rather to a situation in which, through no fault of the 
losing party, it has lost the opportunity to appeal the adverse deci­
sion. Such a situation is readily distinguished from a settlement in 
which the decision to forgo an appeal is voluntary.6 1 
For example, in Karcher v. !Y1ay ,62 a case rendered moot by the 
conduct of a party, the Supreme Court rej ected the suggestion that 
ltfunsingwear required the case to be vacated.  In Karcher, the appel­
lants were legislative officers who ,  after unsuccessfully defending 
the constitutionality of a statute in the lower courts , lost their legis­
lative positions .  The new legislators dropped the appeal-effec­
tively accepting the judgment entered by the lower court as if no 
appeal had been taken .63 Appellants then sought to have the j udg­
ment vacated . The Supreme Court refused. "This controversy did 
not be=::orr'e nw o t  due to circumstances unattributable to any of the 
parties . . . . Accordingly, the Munsingwear procedure is inapplica-
ble . . . .  " 64 -rhe Supreme Court therefore allowed the judgment of 
-------------- ---------------------------------------------
57 i';!emoria! Hosp. v .  United States Dep't  of Health & Human Servs . ,  862 F .2d 
1 299, 1 30 1  (7 th Cir .  1 988) .  
58 JV!unsingwear, 340 U . S .  at 40. 
59 !d. 
50 See, e.g. , Memonal Hasp. , 862 F.2d at 1 30 1 ;  Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282 ;  Ringsby Truck 
Lines , inc. v. ·w-estern Conference of Tearnsters, 686 F.2d 720, 72 1 -22 (9th Cir. 1 982) . 
But see K ennedy v. Block, 784 F .2d  1 220 (4th Cir. 1 986) (vacating as moot under ;Hun­
sing-wear doctrine judgment of district court where parties settled after the trial court's 
decision ) .  
6 l Se,, Urti ted States v .  Garde, 848 F .2d  1 307 ,  1 3 1 1  n . 8  (D .C .  C i r .  1 988) (" [T] he 
pri1:nary objectiv·e behind vacating a lower court opinion [avoiding prejudice to an appel­
lant who has b'=en precluded from obtaining review] would be distorted if a party were 
allowed c o  ren der deliberately a judgment unreviewable by its own action. ") . 
5� 48L1 U . S .  7'.>. ( 1 987) . 
63 App<'ll:mts attempkd to continue to l it igate the case in their individual capaci­
ties, hut the court held tint the real party in interest was the New Jersey Legisiatun: and 
diornissed the action. !d. at  80-8 1 .  
c,� "rd. 3. t 8 3 .  
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the dis trict  court to s tand. 
Courts have applied the same reasoning to cases s ettled while 
an appeal is pending. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Ringsby Truck 
Lines v. Western Conference of Teamsters : "We find the distinction be­
tween litigants who are and are not responsible for rendering their 
case moot at the appellate level persuasive. "65 The court explained 
that if courts were to equate pos�udgment settlement with moot­
ness then any litigant dissatisfied with a court 's  decision could, by 
des troying his right of appeal, simply wipe that decision from the 
books. 66 
Moreover, in the case of an unconditional settlement,  a finding 
that the controversy is  moot does not justify vacatur. The case is no 
more moot than in any o ther circumstance in which a party chooses 
to abandon its claim or to forgo an appeal.67 When settlement is  
conditioned on vacatur, there is no mootnes s .  If the court refuses to 
vacate the j udgment, the settlement does not take effect, and the 
case continues . Under such circumstances, there is  a live case or 
controversy.68 
If the !vfunsingwear rule does not apply, a court has discretion to 
vacate . The circuit  courts have taken three different approaches re­
garding the exercise of this discretion.  The first approach is  that 
espoused by the Second Circuit in Nestle Co. v. Chester 's Market, Inc. 69 
In Nestle, the Nestle Company sued the defendants alleging that de­
fendants ' use of the term " toll house" constituted trademark in­
fringement.  The trial court granted defendants '  m o tion for partial 
summary j udgment, holding that " toll house" was a generic term 
and thus could not be a trademark. While Nestle' s  appeal was pend­
ing, the parties settled both the trademark infrin gement claim and 
all other pending claims and coun terclaims.  70 Because Nestle 
wanted to continue to claim that the use of the term " toll house" 
constituted trademark infrin gement,  the parties j ointly moved the 
court to vacate the dis trict court's  j udgment.  The settlement was 
conditional and would proceed only if the court granted the parties' 
65 Ringsby , 686 F.2d at 72 1 .  
66 !d. 
67 See, e.g. , iv/emorial Hasp. , 862 F.2d at 1 30 l :  ("A settlement vvhile the case is on 
appeal is a reason why the losing party no longer wants the judgment reversed. The 
case is neither more nor less moot than i t  would be if the loser were satisfied with the 
judgment and complied without appealing. " ) .  
68 See Nestle Co.  v. Ches ter's Mkt . ,  Inc . ,  756  F .2d  280 ,  28 1 ( 2d  C i r .  1 985 ) ;  Ringsby, 
586 F .2d at  72 1 -22 .  
69 756 F .2d  280.  
70 The case w a s  sett led during the parties ' pre-argument conference with staff 
counsel for the Second Circuit pursuant to the Second Circui t ' s  CAMP procedure. Nes­
t le Co. v. Chester' s lv!kt . ,  Inc . ,  596 F. Supp. 1445,  1 446 (D.  Conn.  1 984) .  
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motion to vacate.7 1 
The district  court denied the parties '  motion to vacate, finding: 
1 )  that the case was not moot ;  2) that the decision to vacate the 
judgment was discretionary; and 3) that the public interests in favor 
of finality of j udgments and in adj udicating trademark validity out­
weighed the parties ' interests in settlement. 72 The parties then 
made their motion to the S econd Circuit .  The S econd Circuit re­
versed the decision, finding that the trial court had "abused its dis­
cretion. "73 The appellate court essentially conducted the same sort 
of balancing tes t that the trial court used, but concluded that the 
trial court's reliance on the public interes t in finality of judgments 
was misplaced. Moreover, the court concluded that the importance 
of promoting settlement superseded any interest in finality . 74 
Nestle illus trates the federal courts ' s trong policy75 of encourag­
ing settlement. 76 The court in Nestle observed that refusal to vacate 
the j udgment in a case in which settlement is conditioned on vacatur 
would not only cause the parties to expend additional time and re­
sources, but would force litigants willing to settle to submit to con­
tinued litigation. 77 "We see no jus tification to force these 
7 1 !d. (quoting Affidavit of Barry Garfinkel, Attorney for Defendant Saccone's Toll 
House, 'll 7 ) .  
7 2  The dis trict court considered i t s  ruling t o  be discretionary under Rule 60(b) . 
Further, the lower court noted that the Second Circuit had previously affirmed a denial 
of a Rule 60(b) motion that the parties made after settlement to avoid the collateral 
estoppel effects of the decision. !d. at 1450 n.6 (citing Sampson v. Radio Corp .  of Am. ,  
4 3 4  F .2d 3 1 5  ( 2 d  Cir. 1 970) ) .  
7 3  Nestle, 756 F.2d a t  284. 
74 The Second Circuit made no attempt to dis tinguish or to reverse its previous 
decision in Sampson , 434 F.2d 3 1 5 ,  in which i t  had rejected the notion that a party could 
use a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) to avoid the adverse consequences of a settle­
ment decision. See also Cover v. Schwartz, 1 33 F .2d 54 1, 546- 4 7 (2d Cir. 1 942)  (holding 
that dismissal of a suit ,  as distinguished from dismissal of an appeal ,  should not be auto­
matic when a case is  settled or compromised while on appeal) ,  cerl. denied, 3 1 9  U .S .  748 
( 1 943) .  
75 See WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 12, § 3533 . 1 0 ,  a t  43 1-32 (advocating 
the absolute right of the parties to settle on terms that include vacatur, based on " [a]l l  of 
the policies that make voluntary settlement so  important a means of concluding litiga­
t ion"); see also Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods.  Group, Inc . ,  8 1 9  F .2d 277  (Fed. 
Cir. 1 987)  (following Nestle based on the s trong policy of the courts in favor of voluntary 
set tlements) . 
76 Critics have suggested that the Nestle dec is i o n  s temmed from the Second Cir­
cuit 's  desire to uphold a settlement which had been arranged through the CAMP pro­
cess and that the Second Circuit 's infatuation with the CAMP procedure motivated its 
decision more than the general goal of encouragi ng settlement. See Mary A. Donovan & 
Marya Lenn Yee, Letting The Chips Fall. The Second Circuli 's Decision on Toll House, 52 
BROOKLYN L.  REV. 1 029,  1030-3 1 ( 1 986) . 
7 7 The Second Circuit 's recent decision in Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 888 
F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1 989) ,  somewhat undermines Nestle' s  reliance on encouraging settle­
ment as a justification for its decis ion.  In Cuomo, the Second Circuit con sidered the ap­
plication of Nestle to a case which had been s ettled while on appeal ,  but in which the 
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defendants , who wish only to settle the present litigation, to act as 
unwilling private attorneys general and to bear the various costs and 
risks of litigation.  "78 
Writing for the S eventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook forcefully 
rej ected the Nestle approach . In Memorial Hospital v. United States De­
partment of Health & Human Services,79 the court held that the Seventh 
Circuit should, as a general rule, refuse requests to vacate.80 Judge 
Easterbrook opined that a j udicial decision is a public act which pri­
vate agreements cannot and should not erase . 8 1 The court further 
n oted that there are many circumstances in which parties decide to 
forgo the right to appellate review, but that such a decision does not 
require the court "reflexively" to vacate the j udgment .82 
The Memorial Hospital court also disagreed with the Second Cir­
cuit's analysis of the effect of vacatur on settlement.  It noted that a 
court is under an obligation to bring independent judgment to a 
decision in which it is required to act.  By automatically complying 
with the wishes of the settling parties,  the court risks becoming a 
settlement agreement was not conditioned on vacatur (i.e. , the agreement did not explic­
itly address the issue of vacatur) .  ld. at 233-34 . 
The trial court's  decision in Cuomo was a comprehensive 56-page opinion that in­
cluded, in ter alia, consideration of the p laintiff's constitutional challenges to nvo state 
statutes, the "Used and Useful Act," N .Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 66(24) (McKinney 1 989), 
and the "LIPA Act ,"  N.Y.  PuB .  AuTH. LAw § §  1020 to 1 020-hh (McKinney 1 989) . The 
court upheld the LIPA Act against constitutional challenge, but found that th,� Used and 
Useful Act violated the equal protection clause. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 
666 F. Supp. 370 (N.D .N.Y. 1 987) . Plaintiff perfected an appeal of that portion of the 
judgment which upheld the LIPA Act (as well as the denial of plaintiff's  various other 
constitutional challenges),  and defendants cross-appealed the adverse holding as to the 
Used and Useful Act. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 888 F.2d at 2 3 2 .  After settle­
ment, the parties moved for a consent judgment. When the court denied the motion, 
p laintiff (but not defendants) reinstated its appeal. Id. at 252. 
The Cuomo court found that the appeal was moot by virtue of the settlement agree­
ment. Further, the court concluded that the Nestle decision required vacatur of that por­
tion of the judgment which was currently on appeal. Although the settlement 
agreement did not address the issue of vacatur, the court found that, where the parties 
had agreed on settlement, they "necessarily agreed on vacatur of the district court's 
judgment." '  !d. at  234. The court, therefore, ordered vacatur in spite of the dr:fend:mts ' 
expressed opposition. 
78 Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284. 
79 862 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1988) . 
80 Unlike the litigants in Nestle, the parties in Memorial Hojpital explici tly requested 
thal the court vacate both the district court judgment and the court's opinion. ld. at 
1 300-01. 
8 1  This rationale may be further supported by the facts in J\ifemonol Hospital. There, 
the motion was for vacatur of the district court's opinion . The Second Circuit in 1Vestle, in 
contrast, addressed only the issue of vacating the trial court's judgment .  But s.?e ,\'estle, 596 
F. Supp. at 1 446 (parties '  moving papers sought vacatur "of the ruling and order of this 
court dated August 2 3 ,  1 983, together with the findings and condusions embodied 
therein").  
fl '2  Memorial Hosp. , 862 F.2d at 1 30 1 .  
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tool of the settlement process, a "bargaining chip." 83 In addition, a 
legal principle that does not require vacatur will encourage settle­
ment at an earlier stage of litigation and thereby conserve judicial 
resources .  
Finally, the court held that a fmal judgment implicates not  only 
the public interest in a decision's  precedential value and the possi­
ble preclusive effect of the j ud gment on third p arties,  but als o  addi­
tional public interests , such as vindication of the authority of the 
courts .84 The process that the Nestle decision sanctioned, whereby 
the public act of a public official can, in effect, be bought and sold, 
was particularly troubling to the court .85 The court concluded that 
these public interests must take priority over the private interests of 
a litigant in settlement. Although the court agreed that the parties 
were free to control the progress of their litigation and the resolu­
tion of their dispute, the court firmly s tated that litigants should not 
be free to control the permanence of j udicial decisions .86 
The Ninth Circuit has adopted an intermediate approach . In 
two recent cases,  Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Team­
sters 87 and National Union Fire lmurance Co. v. Seafirst Cmp. , 88 the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the decision to vacate should be sub­
ject neither to an absolute rule in favor of vacatur nor to an absolute 
refusal to vacate. In Ringsby , the court rej ected the notion that the 
!Vfunsingwear doctrine compelled vacatur. Further, the court de­
nounced the theory that a p arty should be able singlehandedl.y to 
destroy the collateral consequences of a judgment by giving up his 
or her right to appeal through postjudgment settlement .89 Rather, 
according to the Ringsby court, the decision to vacate should depend 
upon a balancing of " the competing values of finality of j udgrnent 
and right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes. "90 The 1?.ingsby 
court noted that the district court's  findings had already been given 
collateral estoppel effect in a second action . 9 1  The district court's 
ability to rely on the judgment in the s ettled case would have been 
jeopardized if that case had been vacated.  Accordingly, the court 
declined to undermine that reiiance by vacating the original dis trict 
court j udgment .  
83 !d. 
34 .1d. at 1 302-03 . 
85 !d. at 1 302 . 
36 !d. a t  1 303.  
8 7  6 8 6  F.2d 720 (9 th  Cir. 1 982) .  
81:1 89 1 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1 989) . 
89 Ringsby , 686 F.2d at  72 1 (quoting MooRE ' s  FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 35, ] 
0 .4 1 6[6] ) .  
")0 !d. a t  722 .  
9 1  !d. at 7 2 1 n. l .  
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In National Union ,  the Ninth Circuit expanded on the appropri­
a te test to be employed in ruling on motions to vacate.  The court 
first reaffirmed the vitality of Ringsby and its finding that the Mun­
singwear doctrine is inapplicable t o  cases which are mooted b y  settle­
ment.92 In particular, the court rej ected National Union's  invitation 
to distinguish between situations in which one party acts unilaterally 
to moot an action and those in which mootness is the result of bilat­
eral action,  such as settlement.93 
While recognizing the importance of encouraging settlement, 
the Ninth Circuit opined that parties should not have an absolute 
right to des troy the exis tence of unfavorable judgments at wil l .  The 
court agreed with the Nestle policy of encouraging s ettlements .94 It 
determined, however, that the cost of forgoing the absolute rule of 
Nestle was not high enough to outweigh the public interest in the 
finality of judgments and the legitimate interest of third parties in 
the preclusive effect of the judgment.95 
The court also rejected the absolutist approach of Jl.1emorial Hos­
pital. In the Ninth Circuit 's  opinion , such an " inflexible rule . . .  
would raise the cost of settlement too high . "96 Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the most reasonable approach was to 
consider the individuai equities involved in each case.  In National 
Union , that analysis supported the district court' s  decision to deny 
vacatur. National Union had actions pending agains t  a number of 
other parties who had intervened in the motion to vacate for the 
express purpose of protecting that j udgment, along with its attend­
ant collateral effects . The court concluded that, given the existence 
of these third party interests,  it  was reas onable to prohibit National 
Union from erasing the collateral effect of the prior judgment.97 
HI 
THE CosT oF VACATUR 
Although the decisions discussed :above take different ap-
92 National Union, 89 1 F . 2 d  at 765-67 .  
93 National Union argued that the Ninth Circuit had recognized a unilat­
eral/bilateral distinction in Harrison Wes tern Corp. v .  Uni ted States, 792 F . 2 d  1 39 1  (9th 
Cir. 1 986) . The court found Harrison distinguishable because i t  did not involve a settle­
men t .  See Natwna! Union , 89 1 F . 2 d  at 767.  
94 The National Um:on court noted that in Nestle, unlike Ringsby and National Union, 
the seulement was expressly conditioned on vacatur of the trial court' s  judgment. Na­
twnal Union ,  89 1 F . 2 d  at 768.  The court found it  unneces sary to apply i ts balancing 
analysis to a dispute in  which settlement is  conditioned on vacatur. See id. at 768 n .2 .  
95 id. at 7 6 8 .  By applying a balancing test t o  the facts in Nestle, the Ninth Circuit 
apparently would have denied the motion to vacate,  based on the third party interests 
set out in the district court opinion.  
96 Jd at 769. 
97  !d. 
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proaches in analyzing the proper j udicial reaction to a motion to 
vacate,98 the cases employ the same basic equation : measuring the 
c o s t  of vacatur against the cost of denying the motion to vacate.99 
Each court expressed a concern for the efficient use of litigant and 
judicial resources and attempted to balance the public costs of vaca­
tur agains t  the costs of forgoing a possible settlement.  Such a calcu­
lation is  ideall. y suited for economic analysis . 
An analysis of the costs of vacatur may be dis turbing to those 
s chol"rs 1 00 who embrace a purely private 1 0 1  view of litigation . 1 02 
For them, it is inappropriate to prohibit vacatur if a settlement is 
thereby thwarted because such conduct compels the litigants to be 
unwilling " private attorneys general , "  forced to litigate on behalf of 
the public interest 1 03 rather than in pursuit of their private goals . 1 04 
98 Although ti1e d ifference in  treatment between Nestle and the other cases is based, 
in  part, on the fact that the settlement in Nestle was conditioned on vacatur, neither the 
Seventh nor the Ninth Circuit relied on that ground to distinguish Nestle . Moreover, the 
Second Circuit has expanded the Nestle rule to cases in which settlement was not explic­
itly contingent on vacatur. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 888 F .2d 230, 233 
(2d Cir .  1 989) . 
99 See National Union, 89 1 F .2d at 768 ("While [ the Nestle] position is not without 
some merit, . . .  we elect to weigh the policy interests differently ." ) .  
! 00 See, e.g. , WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 1 2 ; Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects 
of judgments Vacated Pursuant to Settlement, 1 987  U. ILL. L. REv. 73 1 ,  7 5 1 -5 3  (authored by 
Stuart N. Rappaport) . 
1 0 1  In the traditional model of l itigation ,  an action is viewed as bipolar with a self­
contained impact; that is ,  the impact of the judgment is confined to the parties . Tradi­
tional l itigation is considered party initiated and party controlled. See Chayes ,  supra note 
l l , at 1 282-83.  Professor Fiss terms this model the "dispute-resolution" model of l itiga­
tion. Fiss, The Supreme Court, supra note 1 5 , at 1 7 .  
I 02 In recent years, scholars such as Professors Chayes and Fiss have observed that 
much civil litigation has evolved away from this private dispute model . See Fiss, The 
Supreme Court, supra note 1 5 , at 44 ("Dispute resolution . . .  does not represent the ideal 
for adjudication . . . .  " ) .  
Chayes has observed that civil l itigation i s  now increasingly concerned with enforc­
ing public values ,  citing areas such as school desegregation cases, antitrust, securities 
law, and environmental litigation .  In  all of these areas and many others, the l it igants are 
doing more than addressing a private wrong; they are identifying and seeking to remedy 
an ongoing mischief and its consequences, not merely for them but for others. Profes­
sor Chayes terms this type of l it igation "public law l it igation" and suggests that this 
evolution requires a reconsideration of the court's role in the judicial process .  See 
Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1 98 1  Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger 
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 ( 1 982) . 
l 03 Professor Fiss answers this argument by asserting that it misapprehends the true 
costs of a settlement: 
To be against settlement is  not to urge that parties be "forced" to liti­
gate, since that would interfere with their autonomy and distort the adju­
dicative process ;  the parties will be inclined to make the court believe that 
their bargain is  justice. To be against settlement is  only to suggest that 
when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears , and for a 
price it does not know it is paying. 
Fis s ,  supra note 8 ,  at 1 085 .  
1 04 See Nestle Co.  v .  Chester's Mkt . ,  Inc . ,  756 F .2d 280 ,  284 (2d Cir .  1 985) . 
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The response to this argument is that j u di cial action in cases such as 
j\1emorial Hospital does not prevent the p arties from settling the liti­
gation; rather, it simply prevents the p arties from a greeing to re­
quire an affirmative j udicial action-vacatur. 
The starting point for Judge Easterbrook's  analysis in Memorial 
Hospital was his observation that a judicial decision is something 
more than the resolution of a private inter-party dispute. Judge Eas­
terbrook termed a j udicial decision, whether in the form of a court 
decision or a jury verdict, a public act. 1 05 Curiously, neither the Sec­
ond nor the Ninth Circuit rej ects this characterization; indeed, both 
expressly accept i t  as valid . The disagreement concerns how much 
weight to give the public nature of the decision.  
The j udicial determination whether to grant a motion to vacate 
is also a public act. The granting of a motion to vacate is  not minis­
terial . 1 06 By propounding a rule that m otions to vacate will not be 
routinely granted in situations involving posljudgment settlement, 
the courts are indicating that this is one of the many areas in which 
courts will not be bound by the agreement of the parties . 1 07 For 
1 05 Moreover, under the public law model of l itigation, the court must consider the 
public impact of rendering any judicial decision. Where the public law m odel is clearly 
applicable, judges cannot escape the policy implications of their decisions; their actions 
have a public effect which extends beyond the impact on the l i t igants .  See Chayes, supra 
note 1 02 .  Compare United S tates v. Mansion House Center North, 95 F .R .D.  5 1 5  (E .D .  
Mo.  1 982)  (refusing to permit the government to set t le  a case which i t  initiated for the 
purpose of pro tecting the public interest) , rev 'd in part on other grounds, 742 F .2d 4 76 (8th 
Cir. 1 984) .  " [T]hese cases involve issues that in importance rise above the normal mat­
ters addressed by private l itigants in lawsuit s . "  !d. at 5 1 7 . 
1 06 See supra notes 4 7-97 and accompanying text. 
l 07 This concept is not unique to the issue of vacatur. There are many subjects upon 
which the agreement of the parties has been held insufficient to bind the court. See, e.g. , 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U .S .  497 (parties cannot confer j urisdiction on the court by agree­
ment) , reh 'g denied, 368 U.S .  869 ( 1 96 1 ) ; Swift & Co .  v. Hocking Valley R .R . ,  243 U.S .  
28 1 ,  289 ( 1 9 1 7) (stipulation by parties cannot bind the court in respect of i ts adjudica­
tory function) ; O'Connor v. City of Denver, 894 F .2d 1 2 1 0, 1 2 25-26 (i Oth Cir. 1 990) 
(court determines the effect ,  if  any, of s tipulations of fact ) ; Technicon Ins truments Corp. 
v. Alpkem Corp . ,  866 F.2d 4 1 7 ,  42 1 ( Fed . Cir. 1 989) (parties cannot rais e  appellate issue 
by stipulation) ;  National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows , 789 F .2d 57 1 ,  574 
(7 th Cir. 1 986) (party may not compel a court to decide a constitutional issue by s tipula­
tion) ; see also joHN H. WIGMORE, EviDENCE, IN  TRIALS AT CoMMON LAw § 7a, at 6 0 1  n .35 
(Tillers rev . 1 983)  (discussing j udicial reluctance to accept s tipulations by parties which 
contravene the rules of evidence) . These decisions place a higher premium on the in­
tegrity of the tribunal than on the right of the parties to control their lawsuit. As Profes­
sor Wigmore observes, i t  is not clear that this position actually conflicts with the 
assumed right of the parties to control the disposition of their dispute.  Jd. at 604. The 
parties may be free to choose their adj udicative forum,  but having chosen it, they may 
reasonably be bound by the rules of that forum.  Those rules may include limitations on 
the manner by which parties may dispose of actions. 
The ability of litigants to "gag" the court through settlement and vacatur is analo­
gous to the use of umbrella protective or "secrecy" orders. These orders involve the 
sealing of court files after set tlement with an agreement by the parties and their attor­
neys not to reveal the information disclosed during discovery, the fact and amount of a 
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example,  as the court observed in NLRB v. Brooke Industries, Inc. , 1 08 
the j udicial policy in favor of encouraging settlement does not re­
quire the courts to accept and enforce every consent agreement of 
the parties : 
If [the parties] had agreed that Brooke would be ordered to break 
the knees of its director of labor-management relations, or make 
the director wear a dunce cap, a court would not be required to 
enforce a j udgment embodying that order. That would be a clear 
case of a consent judgment's affecting the rights of a third party . 
Far from being required to rubber stamp such a judgment, a court 
would be obliged to reject it . 1 09 
Similarly, there are circumstances in which the court is explicitly re­
quired to consider the effect that termination of a lawsuit has upon 
third parties or the public interest before permitting settlement or 
dismissal of the suit. 1 1 0 Although a party should not be required to 
continue with a lawsuit against his or her will ,  it is not a necessary 
corollary that a court must do everything in its power to persuade 
the parties to terminate the litigation. 1 1 1  
settlement, or both. See Philip H .  Corboy, Gagging Plaintiffs with Money Assaults the Public 
interest,  THE MANHATTAN LAViYER, Mar. 1 990, at 1 6. Although courts have traditionally 
approved protective orders when both sides agree, the courts in several recent cases 
have recognized a public interest in obtaining access to l itigation information which 
goes beyond the private interest of the individual parties to that l itigation .  See, e.g. , Ci­
pollone v. Liggett Group, Inc . ,  785 F.2d 1 1 08 ,  1 1 2 1  (3d Cir. 1 986) (requiring defendant 
to show that disclosure would cause specific and s ignificant harm to justify protective 
order) ; Graham v. Wyeth Labs . ,  1 1 8 F.R.D.  5 1 1 (D. Kan. 1 988) (refusing request for 
secrecy order to protect discovery information in DPT vaccine l itigation) ; Garcia v .  
Peeples ,  734 S .W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1 987) (overturning trial court's secrecy order) . 
1 0 8  867  F .2d  434 (7th Cir. 1 989) . 
I 09  !d. at 435 .  
1 1 0 See, e.g. , Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Labs . ,  Inc . ,  83 F .R .D.  6 1 5  (S .D .N .Y. 
1 979) (discussion of factors court must consider in deciding whether to approve a pro­
posed settlement of class action) ; FED. R. C1v. P. 23 (e) (requiring court approval for 
dismissal or compromise of class action) ; FED. R .  C 1v. P. 23 . 1 (requiring court approval 
for dismissal or compromise of shareholder derivative action);  William E. Haudek, The 
Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders ' Actions-Part II: The Settlement ,  23 Sw. L.J. 765 ( 1 959) 
(discussing the mechanics of obtaining judicial approval of a derivative suit settlement) . 
For an example of 2 court's detailed consideration of the effect of settlement in a iawsuit 
concerning the provision of foster nre services not only on the plaintiff class, but also 
on the objecting defendant agencies, the city's child care system, and the public at large, 
see Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F.  Supp. 1 292 (S .D.N .Y. 1 986) . 
1 l l Indeed, the propriety of a federal judge acting to facil i tate settlement has 
sparked considerable debate. See generally Chayes , supra !10te 1 1 ; Carrie Menkel­
Meadow, Essay: For and Against Settlement. Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Confer­
ence, 33 UCLA L. REv.  485 ( 1 985) ;  Judith Resnick, Managerial judges , 96 HARV . L REv. 
374 ( 1 982) ;  Hon. Hubert L. Wil l ,  Hon. Robert R .  Merhige, Jr .  & Hon. Alvin B. Rubin, 
The Role of the Judge zn the Settlement Process, 7 5 F .R .D .  203 ( 1 977) . Critics of this judicial 
involvement suggest that by acting as case "managers" rather than adjudicators, judges 
may lose the impartiality and perspective that render their decisions legitimate. See Res­
nick, supm, at 424-3 1 ;  see also Schuck, supra note 26, at 359-65 (risks of j udicial involve­
ment inciude overreaching, overcommitment of the j udge to settlement, and procedural 
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A strict reading of the Nestle decision sugges ts that the Second 
Circuit believes that litigants are entitled to vacatur as a matter of 
right when they settle a case conditioned on vacatur. 1 1 2 Under the 
Nestle theory, the private interests of the parties in settlement l 1 3 out­
weigh the public costs of vacatur as a matter of law. 1 1 4 Given the 
j udicial discretion inherent in the sources of the courts ' authority to 
vacate, however, an absolute rule of law must be based on an ex­
press or implied judicial resolution of this calculu s .  Only by appre­
ciating both the public costs of vacatur as well as the effect of 
vacatur on settlement, can we properly evaluate the Nestle rule. 
A.  Preclusive Effect of a Final Judgment 
1 .  Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion 
The most significant cost associated with vacatur is the des truc­
tion of a j udgment's preclusive effect.  A prior j udgment 1 1 5 may 
serve as a bar to future litigation 1 1 6 in two ways:  as a bar to relitiga­
tion of the same claims under the doctrine of res j udicata, and as a 
unfairness) . Several scholars have also observed that judicia! involvement in the settle­
ment process has failed to produce any empirically measurable d ifference in settlement 
rates . See Menkel-Meadow, supra , at 488 n . l 9  & 494; Resnick, supra , at 4 1 7-24. 
1 1 2 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt. ,  Inc. ,  756 F .2d 280,  283 (2d Cir. 1 985) ; Note, 
Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 24 1 n .55 .  Indeed, the Seventh Circui t's opinion 
in l\1emonal Hospital can also be read as espousing a mandatory rule of  law. See Memorial 
Hosp.  v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs . ,  862 F .2d 1 299 ,  1 300 (7th Cir. 
1 988) .  
1 1 3 The Second Circuit ,  which has adopted the most prosettlement rule regarding 
motions to vacate, is the same Circuit that has adopted the most innovative procedural 
reform for encouraging settlement of cases pending appeal . See supra note 6. Perhaps 
the Second Circuit 's  prosettlement attitude is more reflective of concerns over the man­
agement of appellate dockets than concerns for the rights of l i tigants .  Neither the Sev­
enth nor the Ninth Circui t  has a preargument conference program in which the litigants 
are "encouraged" to settle the action. See id. 
1 1 4 Based on the trial court's explicit finding in Nestle that the parties'  interests in 
settlement 'Nere outweighed by the public interest in favor of finality , the Second Cir­
cuit 's reversal under an abuse of discretion s tandard is difficult to j us tify unless the Sec­
ond Circuit 's  rule is in terpreted as an absolute legal s tandard . See Note,  Avoiding Issue 
Preclusion ,  s upra note 5 ,  at  865 n .34 .  
l l 5 Preclusive effect under principles of  colla teral estoppel r;, a y  apply to less  formal 
determinations as well as to final judgments . See, e.g. , Hartley v. Mentor Corp . ,  869 F.2d 
1 469 (Fed . Cir. 1 989) (preclusive effect given to s tipuL:ned judgment) ; Wellons, Inc. v .  
T . E .  !bberson Co . ,  869 F .2d 1 1 66, 1 1 68 (8th Cir. 1 989) (collateral estoppel effect may 
be given to arbitration award) . 
l 1 6  For purposes of this Article, the preclusive effect of a j udgment is significant 
primarily in preventing future li tigation with third parties . The usual se ttlement agree­
ment provides for a resolution of all pending claims between the parties aris ing from the 
subject transaction and includes a release of such claims. Therefore, the collateral effect 
of the judgment is unlikely to be relevant to any later l itigation between the same par­
ties . Moreover, because the parties have settled the action, the claims which form the 
subject of the l i t igation are not likely to be the subj ect of further l itigation between the 
original parties, and the res judicata effect of the prior j udgmen t , as be tween them, be­
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binding resolution of issues previously litigated, under the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel. 1 1 7 Under the res judicata doctrine, a prior 
judgment which resolves litigation bars all future claims between the 
same parties arising out of that transaction. 1 1 8 Res judicata, also 
known as claim preclusion, bars all claims arising out of the same 
"nucleus of operative facts " whether or not such claims were actu­
ally litigated in the first action. 1 1 9 The preclusive effects of the doc­
trine of res judicata are limited to litigants who were actually parties 
to the first litigation,  parties which were effectively represented in 
the first litigation, and their privies . 1 20 
tempt by United States to l itigate the same issues against defendant with respect to a 
later time period) . 
Moreover, any concern about whether the judgment can be used collaterally be­
tween the original l itigants can be addressed explicitly in the settlement agreement. The 
settling parties can provide for resolution of the collateral consequences of the judg­
ment inter se by comract. See Memorial Hasp. , 862 F .2d at 1 303 .  The parties may agree by 
contract not to plead the judgment as preclusive in any further dispute. 
1 1 7 Res judicata and collateral estoppel collectively form the law of preclusion . See 
FLEMING jAMES,  JR . & GEOFFREY C.  HAZARD, JR. , CIVIL PROCEDURE § l 1 . 3 (3d ed. 1 985) .  
It is unclear whether the appropriate law of preclusion in the federal courts i s  federal law 
or the law of the forum state. Compare St .  Paul Fire & Marine Ins .  Co. v. Weiner, 606 
F.2d 864 , 868 (9th Cir. 1 979) (a federal court sitting in diversity should apply the preclu­
sion rules of the forum state) with Allan D. Vestal, Res judicata/ Preclusion by judgmen t: The 
Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH L. REv. 1 723  ( 1 968) (advocating a uniform federal 
law of preclusion in federal courts) . 
The preclusion s tandards of most s tates hold that federal law determines the 
preclusive effect of  a federal court judgment. See Stoll  v .  Gottlieb, 305 U .S .  1 65 ( 1 938) 
(the scope and effect of a federal court judgment is a matter of federal law) ; Pi lie & Pilie 
v. Metz, 54 7 So. 2d 1 305 ,  1 3 1 0- 1 1 (La. 1 989) (citing cases ) ;  WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, 
supra note 1 2 , § 4468; Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Resjudicata , 85 YALE L.J .  74 1 ( 1 976) ;  
see, e.g. , Smith v .  Safeco Ins .  Co. ,  863 F .2d 403 , 404 (5th Cir .  1 989) (federal law should 
be applied to determine the preclusive effect of the judgment in a diversity case) . Thus,  
the effect of vacatur on the preclusive effect of a federal dis trict court judgment is a 
matter of federal law. Cf Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons , 4 70 
U .S .  373 ,  380 ( 1 985) (the law of the rendering s tate determines the preclusive effect of a 
state court judgment) ; Kremer v .  Chemical Constr .  Corp . ,  456 U.S .  46 1 ,  48 1 -82 ( 1 982) 
(same) .  
l i S See RESTATEM ENT (SECOND) OF juDGMENTS § 24 comment a ( 1 982) . 
1 1 9  See, e.g. , Lane v .  Peterson, 899 F .2d 737 ,  742- 43 (8th Cir. ) , cert. den 1ed, I l l  S.  Ct .  
74 ( 1 990) ; Olmstead v .  Amoco Oil Co. ,  725 F.2d 627 , 632 ( 1 1 th Cir. ) ,  reh 'g denied, 73 1 
F .2d 89 1 ( 1 1 th Cir.  1 984) ;  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF juDGMENTS § 24 comment b 
( 1 982 ) .  
i 2 0  Professor Semmel describes the concept of privity as  follows : 
Where a party to the second action was not a party to or in control of the 
first action he may still be bound if his relationship to a party in the first 
action is sufficiently close, his interests were adequately represented and 
there <.Jre independent reasons (other than avoiding repeated l i t igation) 
for holding the first judgment binding. 
Herbert Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and joinder of Parties , 68 CoLUM.  L. REv. 
1 <157 ,  1 459-60 ( 1 968) .  For a description of the categories of litigants which may be 
considered bound by a prior j udgment based on the concepts of common interest,  ade­
quate represen tation,  or control,  see S',ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF jUDGMENTS §§ 39- 4 2  
( l  982) 
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Commentators have focused primarily on the effect of vacatur 
on collateral estoppel, 1 2 1  but vacatur may be used to avoid the res 
j udicata consequences of a j udgment as well . Indeed ,  the govern­
ment in A1unsingwear was seeking to avoid application of the doctrine 
o f  res j udicata. 1 22 And in National Union , the judgment from which 
National Union unsuccessfully s ought relief was found to have res 
j udicata effect in a subsequent action by National Union against 
Seafirs t's  attorneys . 1 23 With the movement away fro m  a s trict rule 
of privity to one in which the courts take a more pragmatic ap­
proach-i. e. , apply res judicata to litigants whose interes ts were ade­
quately represented in the prior proceeding 1 24-courts must 
consider both the res j udicata and collateral estoppel effects of a 
j ud gment when ruling on a motion to vacate. 1 25 
The preclusion doctrine more commonly implicated by vacatur 
decisions is the doctrine of collateral es toppel . Collateral es toppel 
or issue preclusion provides that if an issue is fully and fairly liti­
gated, the loser will be barred from challenging the determination 
of that issue in a subsequent action. Unlike res judicata, the modern 
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not require mutuality-that is, 
collateral estoppel may be invoked by, although not against ,  a liti­
gant who was not a party to the initial litigation . 1 26 
The requisites for application of collateral estoppel have been 
articulated in a number of ways,  but the general requirements are 
undisputed . To give a previous judgment preclusive effect,  " the is­
sue must have been actually litigated in the prior pro ceeding, the 
parties must have been given a full and fair opportunity to do so, 
and the issue must provide the basis for the final j ud gm ent entered 
therein . " 1 27 Cases frequently sugges t  o ther factors, but they are 
1 2 1  See Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5 ,  at 247-50 (discussing effect of 
vacatur on issue preclusion) ; Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion , supra note 5 ,  at 860 (focusing 
on effect of vacatur on issue preclusion) ; Note, The Impact of Collateral Estop,tJel, supra note 
5 ,  at 343 (focus ing on doctrine of collateral estoppel) . 
1 22 See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc . ,  340 U .S .  39, 39 ( 1 950) . 
1 2 3  The court i n  Davis , Wright &Jones v .  National Union Fire Ins .  Co . ,  709 F .  Supp. 
1 96 (W. D .  Wash. 1 989) found that Seafirst's attorneys were in privity with Seafirst for 
purposes of res judicata. In so holding, the court noted that the doctrine of res judicata 
had expanded to encompass a broader circle of litigants, including those who were effec­
tively represented in a prior l i tigation.  " [S] trict rules of privity no longer govern 
whether res judicata is applicable. " !d. at 20 l .  
1 24 See, e.g. ,  Nevada v. United States , 463 U . S .  1 1 0 ,  1 35 ( 1 983 ) ;  if Martin v. Wilks, 
490 U .S .  755 ( 1 989) . 
1 2 5 Although expansion of the doctrine of  res j udicata increases the possibility that a 
judgment may be applied to bar relitigation by or against related parties ,  see supra note 
1 2 3 ,  the original l itigants are not l ikely to use the judgment between themselves . 
I 2 6 The Supreme Court abandoned the federal requirement of mutuality for applica­
tion of collateral estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Labs . ,  Inc. v. Universi ty of l l l .  Found. ,  402 
U . S .  3 1 3 ,  3 1 3  ( 1 97 1 )  and Parklane Hosiery Co. v .  Shore, 4 39 U . S .  322 ,  322 ( 1 979) .  
1 2 7  Hanley v .  Mentor Corp. ,  869 F .2d 1469, 1 4 7 1  (Fed Cir. 1 989) . 
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merely variations on the three factors articulated in this simple tes t .  
For example, in Parklane Hosiery, the Supreme Court suggested that 
collateral estoppel should not apply if the party in the firs t case did 
not have "every incentive" to litigate the firs t action "fully and vig­
orously. " 1 28 Although the Court may have intended to add an ele­
ment, as a practical matter i t  was simply providing interpretive 
guidance for the requirement that a party have a full and fair oppor­
tunity to litigate the issue in the first case . 1 29 
In recent years , the federal courts have become increasingly 
willing to apply collateral estoppel to prevent multiple or repeated 
litigation of the same issue. 1 30 The Supreme Court has explained 
the policy reasons for the doctrine as follows :  
T o  preclude parties from contesting matters that they have h a d  a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from 
the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,  conserves 
j udicial resources,  and fos ters reliance on j udicial action by mini­
mizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions . 1 3 1 
In Munsingwear the Court noted the s trong p olicy supporting the use 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel and expressly approved the 
" principle which seeks to bring litigation to an end and promote 
certainty in legal relations . " 1 32 Accordingly, if the prerequisites are 
met, courts favor the application of collateral estoppel . 1 33  
1 2 8 Parklane Hosiery , 439 U.S .  at 332 .  
1 29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF jUDGMENTS § 27 ( 1 982) .  
1 30 As the Blonder-Tongue Court observed: 
Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of 
unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming ta­
ble or "a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the 
lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of 
procedure." 
402 U .S .  at 329 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v .  C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U . S .  1 80,  
1 85 ( 1 952) ) ;  see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S.  at 326 ( issue preclusion serves the "dual 
purpose of protecting l itigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue . . .  and 
of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless l it igation") . 
1 3 1  Montana v .  United States, 440 U.S .  1 47 ,  1 53-54 ( 1 979) . 
1 32 United States v .  Munsingwear, Inc. ,  340 U .S .  36, 38  ( 1 950) . Indeed, the out­
come in lvtunsingwear results from the Court's conclusion that the need for res judicata in 
"providing terminal points for l i tigation" outweighs the government's claim of preju­
dice from application of the doctrine. !d. at 4 1 .  
1 3 3 The federal courts have frequently given preclusive effect to findings in prelimi­
nary proceedings, such as motions for preliminary injunctions. See, e.g. , Commodity Fu­
tures Trading Comm'n v .  Board of Trade, 70 1 F .2d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 1 983 ) .  The 
courts' rationale is that such findings may have been rendered under circumstances 
which make them sufficiently reliable to preclude relitigation. For example, in Com modity 
Futures , the court noted that the lower court judge had made some 45 detailed findings 
of fact after a six-day hearing on the preliminary inj unction, and that these findings were 
later affirmed on appeal. The court concluded that the trial court was not required to 
vacate those findings, an action that would have prevented subsequent courts from giv­
ing them preclusive effect. 
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Litigants may invoke collateral estoppel offensively or defen­
sively. 1 34 In defensive collateral estoppel , a defendant interposes as 
a complete or partial defense a prior adverse determination against 
the plaintiff. The defendant's argument is essentially "you lost 
against someone else; you can't  relitigate the same issue against 
me . "  Such use of collateral estoppel prevents a plaintiff who lost in 
previous litigation from relitigating his or her case a gainst a new 
opponent.  
In offensive collateral estoppel, a plaintiff seeks to prevent the 
defendant from denying liability on the theory that a court has ad­
j ud ged the defendant liable in a previous action . 1 35 For example, a 
plaintiff in a product liability lawsuit may use offensive collateral es­
toppel to take advantage of the fact that the defendant manufacturer 
has already litigated a gainst another plaintiff the issue of whether 
the product is unreasonably dangerous , and lost . 1 36 
Commentators have suggested that, whereas defensive collat­
eral estoppel promotes j udicial economy by encouraging plaintiffs 
to join all pos sible defendants in a single action, o ffensive collateral 
es toppel has the opposite effect. 1 37 A potential plaintiff may ob­
s erve the progress of the litigation , secure in the knowledge that he 
or she may take advantage of any favorable results in that litigation, 
without being bound by any adverse rulings . 1 38 
1 3 4  The distinction between offens ive and defensive collateral estoppel was first ar­
ticulated in Currie, supra note 1 9. 
1 3 5 The Supreme Court has described offensive collateral estoppel as the situation in 
which "a plaintiff is seeking to estop a defendant from rel i tigating the issues which the 
defendant previously l i tigated and lost against  another plaintiff."  Parklane Hosiery , 439 
U.S .  at 329 .  
1 36 Professor Ratcliff terms the ability of a future plaintiff to take advantage of the 
favorable aspects of a prior l i t igation while avoiding unfavorable results ,  the "option 
effect . "  See Jack Ratcliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 Tr:x. L REv. 63 
( 1 988) . 
1 3 7 See Michael A. Berch, A Proposal To Pem1it Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties Seeking 
Affirmative Relief, 1 979 ARIZ. ST. L.J .  5 1 1 ,  530-3 1 ;  Semmel, supra note 1 20; Note, Preclu­
sion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention,  79 COLUM. L. REv . 1 55 1 ,  1 554 ( 1 979) (au­
thored by Louis Touton) ;  Note, Nonmutuality: Taking the Fairness out of Collateral Estoppel, 
1 3  IND.  L. REv. 563, 57 1 ( 1 980) (authored by Janet Schmitt Ell is) ; Comment ,  Mandatory 
Intervention: Expansion of Collateral Estoppel in Favor of Single Defendants Against i\1ultiple Plain­
tiffs m Federal Civil Litigation,  14 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 44 1 ,  442 ( 1 98 1 ) (authored by 
Michael C .  Sachs ) ;  Note, supm note 1 00, at 737-38;  Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion ,  supm 
note 5,  a t  860; cf Craig Callen & David Kadue, To Bwy Mutuality, Not to Prmse It: An 
A nalysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co.  v.  Shore,  3 1  HASTINGS L.J .  755 
( 1980) (arguing that criticism of using offensive unilateral colla teral estoppel has been 
exaggerated and that courts are quite capable of applying lhe doctrine fairly) . 
1 38 Some might argue that a court's decision on a motion to  vacate should consider 
the type of estoppel that may result from the judgment ,  and that a court should decline 
to award vacatur in cases in which defensive collateral es toppel may be anticipated. The 
rationale of this approach is that defensive collateral estoppel promotes efficiency and 
reduces potential unfairness to future litigants.  Courts, however, do not  appear to have 
considered this factor. In Nestle, for example, the court seemed unconcerned that the 
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2 .  The Effect of Vacatur on Preclusion 
A final j udgment by a federal court retains all of its preclusive 
effect pending appeal; the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res 
j udicata may be applied to a j udgment which is pending appeal . 1 39 
Though there is no requirement that a j udgment be appealed (and 
subsequently affirmed) in order to have collateral estoppel effect, l 40 
the fact that a party has appealed does not prevent a j udgment from 
being used as a basis for collateral estoppel . 1 4 1 Nor will a settlement 
alone1 42 des troy the collateral es toppel effect of a j udgment. 14 3  
Vacatur o f  a j udgment, however, generally prevents the u s e  o f  
that j udgment for collateral estoppel purposes.  "A judgment that 
has been vacated, reversed, or set aside on appeal is thereby de-
original finding of  trademark invalidity could have been used defensively by future liti­
gants against whom Nestle might bring a claim of trademark infringement. 
1 39 See, e.g. , SSIH Equip. S .A.  v .  United S tates Int ' l  Trade Comm'n, 7 1 8  F .2d  365,  
370 (Fed.  Cir .  1 983) ("the law is wel l  settled that the pendency of  an appeal has no affect 
[sic] on the finality or binding effect of a trial court's holding") ;  Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc . ,  707 F.2d 1 493, 1 497 (D.C.  Cir. 1 983) ("Under well-settled federal law, the pen­
dency of an appeal does not diminish the res judicata effect of  a judgment rendered by a 
federal court ." ) ;  MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,  supra note 35 ,  at 52 1 ("pendency of an 
appeal does not suspend the operation of an o therwise final judgment as res judicata or 
collateral estoppel" (footnote omitted)) ;  see also 1 8  WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra 
note 1 2 , § 4433,  at 305-20 . 
1 40 The cases recognize the preclusive effect of a judgment from which no appeal is 
taken . See, e.g. , Federated Dep't Stores , Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U .S .  394 ( 1 98 1 )  (res judicata 
applies to an unappealed adverse judgment) ; United States v. Munsingwear, Inc . ,  340 
U .S .  36, 39 ( 1 950) ("Concededly the judgment in the first suit would be binding in the 
subsequent ones if an appeal, though available, had not been taken or perfected ." ) .  
The case law, however, distinguishes between situations in which a party has and 
forgoes a right to appeal and situations in which no appeal is possible. See, e.g. , id. at 40. 
I t  is often the case that an appeal is technically possible, but practically unavailable. A 
party may "choose" to forgo an appeal simply because he or she lacks the finances for 
further litigation. See, e.g. , Charles Allan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate 
Courts, 4 1  MINN.  L. REv. 75 1 , 780 ( 1 957) ("If in two similar cases the person rich enough 
to afford an appeal gets a reversal, however just, while the person of insufficient means 
to risk an appeal is forced to live with the judgment of the trial court, has justice really 
been improved?") . Although litigants may argue the unfairness of applying issue pre­
clusion under these circumstances, the law of collateral estoppel does not recognize this 
form of hardship. The "hardship" attendant in not being able to buy off the collateral 
effect of an adverse judgment through the settlement process pales next to a party' s  
inability to  attack that adverse judgment directly. 
1 4 1 See SSIH Equip. S.A . , 7 1 8  F.2d at 370; McLendon v .  Continental Group, Inc . ,  660 
F. Supp. 1 553 (D.N.J .  1 987) ; 1 8  WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER , supra note 1 2 , § 4433 ,  at 
308.  
1 4 2  Settlement o f  a n  action prior t o  the entry o f  final judgment generally will not 
result in collateral estoppel effect on the litigation. See Kasper Wire Works , Inc. v .  Leco 
Eng'g & Mach . ,  Inc . ,  575 F .2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1 978) . 
1 43 See Hartley v. Mentor Corp . ,  869 F.2d 1 469, 1 473 (Fed .  Cir. 1 989) ; see aLw Gould 
v .  C ontrol Laser Corp . ,  866 F.2d 1 39 1 ,  1 392  (Fed . Cir. 1 989); Rings by Truck Lines , Inc. 
v .  Western Conference of Teamsters , 686 F .2d 720, 720 (9th Cir. 1 982) ;  Kurian v .  Com­
missioner, 343 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1 965) (giving collateral estoppel effect to opinion of 
appellate court even though case had been settled on remand) . 
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prived of all conclusive effect, both as res judicata and as collateral 
estoppel. The same is true, of course, of a judgment vacated by a 
trial court. "  1 44 " [T]he general rule is that a judgment which is va­
cated, for whatever reason, is deprived of its conclusive effect as col­
lateral es toppel . " 1 45 
One possible reason for the failure of courts to give a vacated 
j udgment preclusive effect is their perception that the issue of pre­
clusion has been considered and implicitly addressed by the vacatur 
decision . Moreover, a party which has settled on condition of vaca­
tur is deprived of his or her b argained-for gain if preclusive effect is 
subsequently applied to the vacated j udgment. 1 46 
On a more practical note, it is frequently difficult to apply 
preclusive effect to vacated judgments because of the second court's 
inability to discern the basis for vacatur. Although collateral estop­
pel might be warranted in the case of a vacatur predicated on settle­
ment, vacatur premised on mootnes s ,  fraud, or mistake would not 
justify application of collateral estoppel. In the m aj o rity of cases, 
however, there is no official record of the basis for the vacatur 
decision . 
Des truction of an adverse judgment' s  collateral es toppel effect 
is the most common reason for a party to seek vacatur. For exam­
ple, in Munsingwear, the government wanted the p rior judgment va­
cated because Munsingwear was attemp ting to have the second 
price-fixing lawsuit against it dismissed, based on the collateral es­
toppel effect of the first judgment. Similarly, the collateral estoppel 
effect of the original j udgment was an important aspect of the Na­
tional Union decision . The defendant National Union had actions 
pending against several o ther parties based on the s ame transaction. 
The settlement agreement between National Union and Seafirst 
specifically required S eafirst to j oin in National Union's  motion for 
vacatur, and Seafirst did so .  The third parties then moved to inter-
1 44 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 35 ,  � 0.4 1 6[2 ] ,  at 5 1 7 ; see alw Jaffree v. 
Wallace, 837 F.2d 1 46 1 ,  1 466 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 988) . 
1 45 Dodrill v. Ludt ,  764 F .2d 442, 444 (6th Cir.  1 985) .  This principle, though, does 
not have absolute acceptance. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds,  Inc . ,  682 F.2d 
1 149, 1 1 9 1 -92 (5th Cir. 1 982) (permitting use of offensive collateral estoppel where 
defendant settled lawsuit after trial but before final judgment was entered) , vacated on 
other grounds and remanded, 460 U .S .  1 007 ,  initial opinion adhered to on remand, 7 1 8  F.2d 725 
(5th Cir . ) ,  cert. denied, 460 U.S.  1 0 1 3  ( 1 983) . Courts have not widely followed Chemetron 
and commentators have criticized the case for its failure to give effect to a prior court's 
decision to vacate. See, e.g. , Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut .  Life Ins. Co. ,  
722 F. Supp.  998,  1 0 1 0  (S .D .N.Y. 1 989) ;  Barker, supra note 5 ,  a t  3 ,  col .  1 .  
1 46 See Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5,  at 248 ("widespread use of issue 
preclusion in cases when [sic] the prior judgment has been vacated might discourage 
settlement") ;  Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion , supra note 5,  at 863-64 ("A rule permitting a 
second forum to preclude relitigation of issues contained in a vacated j udgment would 
reduce settlement conditioned on vacatur to simple settlement . " ) .  
1 ! 
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vene in the motion to vacate in order to argue the issue of the effect 
of vacatur on National Union's  other lawsuits. 1 4 7  As the intervenors 
demonstrated to the Ninth Circuit ,  the dis trict court's judgment had 
already been found by other courts to have preclusive effect-a 
preclusive effect which would be des troyed were the court to grant 
vacatur. 
The decision to vacate a judgment is, in essence, a determina­
tion by the original court that principles of collateral estoppel and 
res judicata will not apply to that original judgment. Therefore, a 
l itigant who is unhappy with a prior decision will attempt to condi­
tion settlement on vacatur, as Nestle did.  If the court grants the 
motion to vacate, the adverse jud gment is removed from the record 
books, and any preclusive effect of that judgment is destroyed. 1 48 
Commentators have argued that the vacating court need not 
concern itself with collateral estoppel effects; this issue will be de­
cided if and when a subsequent court is asked to give the prior judg­
ment preclusive effect. 1 49 The applicability of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel cannot be accurately ascertained 1 50 until the sub­
sequent litigation is  commenced . By granting a motion to vacate, 
the original court essentially would be prej udging the issue and at­
tempting to prevent later courts from giving its judgment 
predusion . 1 5 1 
On the other hand, the argument in favor of having the initial 
judge consider collateral es toppel effects is that he or she is in the 
best position to decide, at least in the first instance, whether his or 
her judgment should continue to enj oy any vitality . The court which 
presided over the trial, heard the witnes ses,  and perhaps played a 
1 4 7  See, e.g. , l'-Iational Union Fire Ins.  C o .  v .  Davis, Wright ,  Todd, Reise & Jones, 1 57 
A.D.2cl 57 1 ,  550 N.Y.S .2d 3 1 5  ( 1 990) (holding that collateral estoppel effect of Sea.first 
j udgment barred subsequent suit in New York) . 
1 48 Cf Chemetron ,  682 F.2d 1 149 ,  vacated on other grounds and remanded, 460 U.S .  1 007 
( 1 983 ) .  
1 49 See, e.g. , RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTS § §  27-29 ( 1 982) ; Note, Avoiding 
Issue Preclusion, supra note 5 ,  at 876-78 .  For example, the subsequent court can decide 
whether the inability of a l i tigam to obtain appellate review in the initial action has de­
prived the litigant of a "full and fair opportunity to litigate." See Gould v .  Control Laser 
Corp . ,  866 F .2d 1 39 1 ,  1 395 (Fed . Cir. 1 989) (Nichols, J . ,  dissenting) . 
1 50 The Ninth Circuit in National Union found the possibility of a preclusive effect 
sufficient to justify denying the motion to vacate .  National Union Fire Ins.  Co.  v .  Seafirst 
Corp . ,  89 1 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1 989) . 
1 5 1  See Gould, 866 F.2d at 1 395 n.6:  
" [  t ]he Blonder- Tongue i ssue is  of speculative effect until any subsequent 
litigation is undertaken." The applicability of Blonder- Tongue, in a s itua­
tion where an agreed settlement and judgment moots the intended <Jnd 
expected appeal, is best left to such later l itigation. Vacating the consent 
judgrnent would preclude a colla teral es toppel defense in a later case and 
decide the issu e  before i t  arises .  
(quoting id. at 1 395 (Nichols ,  J. ,  dissenting) ) .  
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role in the settlement of the case, is  usually the best arbiter of ques­
tions such as whether the parties had a full and fair o pportunity to 
l itigate the issues in the case. Usually the trial court is also in the 
best position to decide whether the settlement of the litigation 
caused a party to forgo a po tentially viable appeal and whether the 
parties have manipulated the procedural posture of the litigation in 
an effort to multiply their opportunities to litigate the same issues . 
Accordingly, the trial court should decide whether its prior j udicial 
actions should be erased by vacatur by assessing these is sues . 1 52 
The denial of a motion to vacate would indicate to a later court that 
the first court felt  its judgment to be sufficiently supported by the 
evidence, sufficiently final, and of sufficient impact to be retained 
notwithstanding the subsequent settlement. 1 53 
The problem with allowing a subsequent court to give collateral 
estoppel effect to a vacated judgment is illustrated by the one dis­
covered case in which a court chose to do so.  In Chemetron Corp. v. 
Business Funds, Inc. , 1 54 a subsequent court gave collateral estoppel 
effect to findings which had been vacated as a result of s ettlement. 
The initial litigation was Cosmos Bank v. Bintliff, 1 55  a two-month 
bench trial in Texas . The trial judge in that case made some 22 1 
findings of fact at the conclusion of the trial and awarded judgment 
against Bintliff, but did not enter a final judgment .  Instead, the par­
ties settled the case and j ointly petitioned the court to dismiss the 
action with prej udice and to withdraw its findings of fact  and conclu­
sions of law. The court agreed to do so . 1 56 
In the subsequent securities case, Chemetron s ou ght ,  by means 
of offensive collateral estoppel, to rely on a number of factual issues 
which had been decided adversely to defendant Bintliff in the prior 
trial. The Fifth Circuit addressed what it considered to be a novel 
question of law: whether the Cosmos Bank litigation was sufficiently 
final to permit the application of collateral estoppel,  even though 
the trial j udge never entered a final j udgment b efore settlement. 
1 52 The trial court's decision to vacate a judgment after settlement may also reflect 
uncertainty about the decision. 
1 53 Courts which have attempted simultaneously to vacate and retain the preceden­
tial value of their decisions have met with little success .  In Mason Tenders Dis trict 
Council Welfare Fund v. Dalton, 648 F. Supp. 1 309,  vacated upon request of the parties, 648 
F. Supp . at 1 3 1 8  (S .D.N.Y.  1 986) , the district court published an opinion despite subse­
quent vacatur, presumably because the opinion dealt with an important issue of first 
impression in the Circuit. The Second Circuit thwarted a later court's attempt  to rely on 
that decision. See Mason Tenders Dist .  Council Welfare Fund v. Akaty Constr. Corp. ,  
724 F.  Supp.  209 (S .D .N .Y.  1 989) , vacated and withdrawn from bound volume by request of the 
court ( 1 990) (available in advance sheets only) . 
1 54 682 F .2d 1 1 49 (5th Cir. 1 982 ) .  
1 55  No. 67-H-590 (S .D .  Tex. 1 975 ) .  
1 56 Chemetron ,  682 F.2d at 1 1 87-88 (discussing procedural history of the litigation) . 
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The Chemetron court, after considering the policy behind the applica­
tion of collateral estoppel, concluded that Chemetron could pre­
clude Bintliff from relitigating the issues which had been decided in 
the prior litigation. The court stated that Bintliff had received a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the original litigation 
and that absolute finality, such as the actual entry of a final judg­
ment, was not required by the doctrine of collateral estoppel . 1 57 
Although the Chemetron court gave considerable attention to the 
finality issue, i t  did not explicitly consider the effect of the trial 
court' s  order withdrawing its findings of fact.  That issue was ad­
dressed only in the partial dissent of Judge Reavley, who concluded 
that the application of estoppel was unwarranted where the parties 
had expressly provided by the terms of their settlement that es top­
pel should not apply. 1 58 Judge Reavley' s  opinion went further, how­
ever, and condemned the application of collateral estoppel to cases 
in which the parties reached settlement after final judgment without 
obtaining vacatur. Stressing the importance of pos t-trial s ettle­
ments, he defended the litigant's right to settle a case for the pur­
pose of avoiding the collateral estoppel effect of the district  court' s  
findings . 1 59 According t o  Judge Reavley, judicial interference with 
that right is "bad law and bad policy . " 1 6o 
Courts have not widely followed Chemetron 1 6 1 for a number of 
reasons . First, by predicatin g estoppel on findings which had been 
vacated , the second court deprived Bintliff of the benefit of his bar­
gain : the s ettlement premised on vacatur. Presumably, courts want 
to avoid overriding private bargains between the parties . Second, 
Chemetron opens the door for judicial reliance on previously erased 
j udgments . If vacatur based on posDudgment settlement does not 
erase the vitality of a judgment, what about vacatur based on moot­
ness?  Chemetron suggests that even in cases which implicate the 
Munsingwear reasoning, a party could be bound by a decision he or 
she was precluded from challenging on appeal . The approach sug-
1 57 !d. at 1 1 9 1  (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U . S .  229, 233 ( 1 945) for the 
principle that collateral estoppel does not require a judgment "which ends the lit igation 
. . .  and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment") . 
1 5 8  !d. at 1 1 98,  1 20 1  (Reavley, J . ,  dissenting) . 
1 59 !d. at 1 20 1 .  
1 60 !d. 
1 6 1 See, e.g. , Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F .2d 442 (6th Cir. 1 985) . Recently, the Southern 
District of New York considered whether it should follow Chemetron by giving collateral 
es toppel effect to a judgment which had been vacated pursuant to a postjudgment settle­
ment. In Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. ,  722 
F.  Supp . 998 (S .D .N .Y. 1 989) , the court noted that even though the Chemetron approach 
would preserve judicial resources , the Nestle decision precluded its adoption. 
" (V) irtually every other sentence in judge Winter's opinion [in Nestle] suggests that liti­
gants prepared to settle may contract with impunity over the preclusive effects of their 
dispute ."  !d. at 1 0 1 1 .  
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gested by Chemetron goes too far, disserving both the public and pri­
vate interes ts in efficiency, predictability, and finality . 
Thus Chemetron does not offer a solution to the vacatur ques­
tion. A decision by the original court to vacate its j udgment should 
operate to des troy the collateral es toppel effect of that judgment. 
Parties who demonstrate entitlement to vacatur-either by introduc­
ing evidence of unfairness or fraud surrounding the original deci­
sion or by establishing that the Munsingwear doctrine applies­
should not be bound by the vacated judgment. 
The application of this rule, however, imposes a distinct cost on 
vacatur-namely, that of des troying the collateral estoppel or res 
j udicata effect of the j udgment .  This cost is fel t  most  directly by 
o ther present or potential litigants who migh t otherwise be able to 
make use of that decision. The cost associated with forcing these 
parties to relitigate a previously decided issue is the most  commonly 
cited argument against vacatur. 1 62 
In addition to the private costs suffered by future litigants, relit­
igation imposes a cost on society 1 63-the cost of consuming scarce 
1 62 It is unclear whether Nestle rej ects as an appropriate basis for denying vacatur the 
demonstrated prejudice to third parties of destroying the preclusive effect of the judg­
ment. Nestle suggests that such prejudice is too remote and speculative to be worthy of 
judicial deference. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt . ,  Inc., 756 F .2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 
1 985) (describing the "plight of hypothetical future defendants facing hypothetical fu-
ture lawsuits") ; see also Note, Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5 ,  at 249-50 (suggesting 
that the fear of relitigation expressed by opponents of vacatur i s  speculative and un­
founded) . It i s  therefore difficult to tell what impact the presence of tangible third par­
ties who are demonstrably prejudiced by vacatur, such as the intervenors in National 
Union,  would have on members of the Nestle school. 
1 63 At least one commentator has suggested that the rel i tigation costs associated 
with vacatur are insubstantial and that this obj ection is therefore unfounded. See Note, 
Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5, at 249-50. One problem with vacatur, however, is 
the fact that vacating a prior judgment is a largely invisible step in the litigation process .  
Most motions to vacate never result in a written opinion that might explain to future 
li tigants and the public the reasons behind the court's decision. In addition, both the 
West Publishing System and the on-line Reporting Services ( LEXIS and WESTLAW) 
permit the courts to withdraw from publication opinions which have been vacated, leav­
ing the public with such scant guidance as the following: 
EDITOR's  NoTE : The opinion of the United States D is trict Court, 
S .D .N .Y . ,  l\1ason Tenders District Council Vvelfare Fund v. Akaty Construction 
Cor;/J. , published in the advance sheet at this citation, 724 F. Supp.  209-
224, was withdrawn from the bound volume because opinion was vacated 
and withdrawn by order of the Court. 
Akaty, 724 F .  Supp. at 209. Thus an attempt to research the reli tigation of vacated deci­
sions is unlikely to reveal, for example, the fact that the case referred to above ir.volved 
the relitigation of an issue decided in an earlier opinion involving the same plaintiff. In 
fact,  the court in Akaty explici tly relied upon the opinion in the earlier case, Mason Ten­
ders Dis trict Council Welfare Fund v. Dalton, 648 F.  Supp. ! 309,  vacated upon request of 
the partzes , 648 F. Supp. 1 3 1 8  (S .D .N.Y.  1 986) . Akaty ,  724 F. Supp . at 2 1 9  n . l O .  Due to 
the fact that the A katy opinion was withdrawn from publication and is available only in 
the West advance sheets, the connection between the two lawsuits is likely to remain 
permanently obscured. 
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j udicial resources to litigate an issue a second time. 1 64 The inter­
venors in National Union cited this cost as a reason for denying Na­
tional Union's motion to vacate . 1 65 They argued that the trial 
court's  judgment, if not vacated, could have a preclusive effect in 
subsequent litigation between National Union and them . 1 66 
Though it did not decide the issue of what preclusive effect the 
lower court's j udgment might have, the Ninth Circuit recognized 
that this potential preclusive effect imposed a significant enough 
cost to warrant denial of the motion to vacate. 1 67 
Commentators have suggested that giving preclusive effect to 
the judgment in an action which has been settled is unfair to the 
losing party . 1 68 Two arguments have been raised in support of this 
claim . The first is that settlement is a private bargain between the 
parties and that the court has no right to become involved in that 
b argain . The parties should be free to settle their dispute on any 
terms upon which they agree, and if the terms include vacatur, a 
court which refuses to vacate is interfering with the settlement pro­
cess .  The problem with this argument is that it views the settlement 
process with tunnel vision . The very reason the parties seek the aid 
of the court in vacatur is their inability, through the settlement pro-
1 64 The argument is that vacatur allows a party to relitigate the same issue as long as 
a supply of new defendants holds out. Giving collateral es toppel effect to the original 
judgment prevents the losing party from wasting scarce judicial resources on the same 
iSSUe. 
1 65 The court in  National Union had the benefit of direct information on the preclu­
sive affect of the trial court's judgment, because the third parties who would be affected 
by vacatur had intervened in order to oppose vacatur. National Union Fire Ins .  Co. v. 
Seafirst Corp . ,  89 1 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1 989) . This s ituation is atypical ; i t  is rare that 
third parties who might benefit from the preclusive effect of a judgment will learn of the 
threat to the judgment in time to make their presence known to the court. The court's 
decision on a motion to vacate should not depend on the presence of such third parties 
before the court. Cf Martin v .  Wilks, 1 09 S .  Ct .  2 1 80 ,  2 1 85 ( 1 989) (citing Chase Nat'! 
Bank v. Norwalk, 29 1 U .S .  43 1 ,  44 1 ( 1 934))  ( the law does not require voluntary inter­
vention by nonparties to preserve their legal rights) .  
1 66 National Union, 89 1 F.2d at 764 . Indeed, subsequent courts found that the trial 
court's judgment in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafirst Corp . ,  No .  C85-396R 
(W.D. Wash. 1 988) barred claims by National Union against Seafirst's attorneys. See 
Davis, Wright & Jones v. National Union Fire Ins .  Co. ,  709 F.  Supp . 196 (W.D.  Wash. 
I 989) , alf 'd, 897 F.2d 1 02 1  (9th Cir. 1 990) ;  National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis ,  
Wright, Todd, Reise & Jones, 1 57 A.D .2d 57 1 ,  55 1 N.Y.S .2d 774 ( 1 990) . 
1 67 The National Union court noted that the third-party interests in maintaining the 
preclusive effect of the prior judgment were legitimate, opining that the cost of destroy­
ing that preclusive effect was high: 
Given the third-party interests in this case and the possible, although 
uncertain status of any preclusive effect, the district court did not abuse 
i ts discretion in denying the motion to vacate . . . .  To the extent there 
may be preclusive effect, National Union should not be able to avoid 
those effects through settlement and dismissal of the appeal. 
National Union, 89 1 F.2d at 769. 
1 68 See, e.g. , Note, supra note l 00. 
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cess , to bind third parties to the terms of the agreement . The fact 
that there are third parties involved who are a ffected by vacatur 
demonstrates that the dispute is not a purely private m atter between 
the two parties to the settlement. 1 69 
A second and more troubling argument advanced against  giv­
ing preclusive effect to j udgments after settlement is the possibility 
that a party may be unfairly bound by a judgment that is in some 
way weak or defective, but has not  been appealed due to settle­
ment . 1 70 Thus ,  collateral es toppel effect is being given to a j udg­
ment that may be erroneous . 1 7 1 
Many settlements are really compromise verdicts , in which par­
ties compensate for perceived weaknesses in the prevailing party's  
case by settling for an amount much less than the initial j udg­
ment . 1 72 Moreover, the initial judgment, although adverse,  may be 
so small as to make it econom ically unwise for the loser to appeal, 
even if the prospects of success on appealare subs tantial.  Finally, a 
single adverse j udgment may represent an aberration, p articularly in 
repetitive or multi-party litigation. 1 73 I t  might b e  unfair for courts 
to prevent a party who has won twenty-five lawsuits on the same 
issue 1 74 from buying his way out of an adverse j ud gment in the 
1 69 Thus a rule against postj udgment vacatur may be more appropriately analogized 
to the general rule that "parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may 
not dispose of the claims of a third party . . .  without that party' s  a greement ."  Local 93, 
Int ' l  Ass 'n  of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U .S .  50 1 ,  529 ( 1 986) .  
1 70 See Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion,  supra note 5 ,  at 869. 
I 7 1 The concept that a judgment can or will be clearly erroneous is ,  of course, sub­
ject to some debate. Some scholars believe that there is no correct or incorrect outcome 
in litigation. See, e.g. , Owen M. Fiss ,  The Death of the Law ?, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. I ,  1 2  
( 1 986) (discussing the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement and the CLS perception 
that a judgment represents a choice rather than a "right answer") . Even those who 
believe that a judgment can be clearly incorrect recognize that the l it igation process 
tends to weed out those cases in which a correct outcome is readily ascertainable. Con­
sequently, those cases which proceed through trial to final judgment are frequently 
those in which there are no "clearly rightful  winners . "  See Dalton, supra note 25 ,  a t  73-
74 . The notion that relitigation allows error correction is meaningless if there is no 
unambiguously correct outcome. 
1 72 See Blonder-Tongue Labs . ,  Inc. v .  University of Il l .  Found . ,  402 U .S .  3 1 3 ,  333 
n .26 ( 1 97 1 )  (recognizing possibil ity that the j udgment in the first sui t  was a compromise 
verdict as one element of unfairness) .  
1 7 3 See Currie, supra note 1 9, at 285-89.  
I 74 An illustration of this issue can be found in the cigarelte l i ti gation. After over 30 
years of litigation , wherein the tobacco industry successfully defended i tself against 
some 334 claims without paying a single penny in damages, a New Jersey jury recently 
returned the first verdict in which the tobacco industry was found liable and awarded 
$400,000 in damages . See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,  893 F .2d 54 1 ,  546 (3d Cir. 
1 990) ; see aLw Note, After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc . :  How Wide Will the Floodgates of 
Cigarette Litigation Open ? ,  38 AM.  U .L .  REv. 1 02 1 ,  1 022 n.7 ( 1 989) (authored by Douglas 
N. Jacobson) .  Although the Court of Appeals overturned the j ury verdict in Cipollone, 
the verdict raised the question of whether the industry would now be subject to numer­
ous lawsuits that could piggy-back on the success of the Cipollone plaintiffs.  
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twenty-sixth. 1 75 
One possible solution is to vacate decisions in which these is­
sues are raised or, alternatively, to vacate routinely when a case is 
s ettled pending appeal . This solution suffers from two flaws . First, 
the elements which may militate against giving a j udgment preclu­
sive effect may not be readily ascertainable at the time of the initial 
vacatur decision. It may be unclear, for example, whether binding a 
party in a subsequent action will be unfair without knowing the 
claims a lleged in that subsequent action,  the prevalence of common 
issues of law or fact,  and the existence and resolution of other re­
lated litigation. The court in the original Munsingwear decision, for 
example, might not have been able to anticipate the government' s  
decision t o  reprosecute Munsingwear for essentially the same viola­
tions during a different time period. 
Second, th� elements of unfairnes s identified by the commenta­
tors are not unique to the application of collateral estoppel after 
settlement. The expansion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to 
situations in which mutuality is absent, the offensive use of collateral 
estoppel by subsequent " free-riders , "  and the risk that a p arty may 
be bound by a judgment in an action in which he or she lacked the 
incentives to defend vigorously, are issues common to the applica­
tion of collateral es toppel outside the settlement context .  Indeed, 
both the Supreme Court decisions which so expanded the doctrine 
and the commentary which followed those decisions identified these 
obj ections . 1 76 Despite the possible validity of these obj ections,  the 
Supreme Court determined that the economies provided by preclu­
sion outweigh such concerns .  
Moreover, although the initial court's decision to  vacate should 
1 75 The reference is to Professor Currie's famous railroad example. See Currie, supra 
note 1 9 . Whether this result is unfair depends on the reasons why the l i tigant was un­
successful in the 26th suit. Was there a dis tinction in the factual evidence presented? 
Was there a change in the applicable law? The use of offensive collateral es toppel in the 
area of mass tort l itigation has been widely discussed. Many commentators believe that 
subjects such as asbestos l itigation, the DES cases, and the Dalkon shield l i tigation are 
ideal for the application of offensive collateral es toppel to reduce issues and expendi­
tures in these mul tiple-plaintiff lawsuits .  See Green, supra note 20, at 1 44 - 4 5  & accompa­
nying notes . Professor Green explains the complexity of applying collateral es toppel in 
the area of asbestos litigation. In  particular, this complexity results from the difficulty in 
both ascertaining whether the prior case (upon which a subsequent claimant wishes to 
rely) was fairly decided and dealing with a multitude of inconsistent or partially inconsis­
tent verdicts. !d. at 200-07. Green concludes that differences in factual issues as well as 
concerns about the reliability of the first verdict limit the util ity of collateral estoppel in 
this area. !d. at 2 1 6. 
1 76  See, e.g. , Parklane Hosiery Co .  v .  Shore, 439  U.S .  322 ,  330-3 1 ( 1 979) ; Blonder­
Tongue, 402 U .S .  at 3 33-34; Kurt Erlenbach, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and Products Liabil­
ity: Reasoning with the Unreasonable, 1 4  ST. MARY's L.J. 1 9  ( 1 982)  (surveying fairness issues 
raised by the application of offensive collateral es toppel in products liability cases) . 
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prevent the preclusive use of the initial judgment, the decision to 
d eny vacatur need not mandate the application of collateral es top­
pel. A subsequent court must nonetheless find that the necessary 
predicates for preclusion are present, which includes a finding that 
the losing party had a full  and fair opportunity to litigate the matter 
in the initial action and that application of preclusion would not be 
fundamentally unfair. 1 77 The court has the discretion to refuse to 
apply preclusion if these prerequisites are not met and indeed can 
reasonably find that the situations identified above create p recisely 
the kind of unfairness that justifies such a refusal . 
B .  Other Collateral C onsequences 
Although estoppel is probably the most significant collateral 
impact of an adverse decision, it is not the only one . In ruling on a 
mo tion to vacate, the court must consider other substantial costs . 1 7s 
One of these costs concerns the extra-judicial effect of a j udicial de­
cision. A judgment does not result simply in a prevailing p arty and 
a losing party; it affects the parties ' substantive rights.  Much civil 
litigation does not focus on a two-party contract dispute in which 
the effect of litigation is felt  exclusively by the p arties thereto . 
Rather, civil litigation s erves to correct unfair or corrupt pra ctices , 
remedy tortious wrongs, and resolve quasi-public issues such as 
trademark and patent protection. Therefore, the resolution of liti­
gation may have external effects which extend beyond the parties to 
the lawsuit. Even in a case in which there are no present or future 
litigants waiting in the wings to benefit from the decision, 1 79 the 
public may benefit at the expense of the losing litigant. 1 so 
1 7 7  Indeed, the Court i n  Blonder- Tongue specifically suggested that one possible situa­
tion in which it would be unfair to apply preclusion is where there is a possibility that the 
j udgment in the first suit was a compromise verdict .  Blonder- Tongue, 402 U .S .  at 333 
n .26 .  
1 78 For a comparison of the collateral consequences of an adverse criminal judg­
ment, see Sibron v .  New York, 392 U .S .  40, 55 ( 1 968) (" [M]ost criminal convictions do 
in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences.  The mere 'possibil ity' that this will 
be the case is enough to preserve a criminal case from ending ' ignominiously in the 
limbo of mootness . ' " (footnote omitted) ) .  
1 79 Of course, potential future litigants may receive a more direct benefit from a 
judgment than simply the right to use it as collateral estoppel in a future lawsuit. A sex 
discrimination suit which results in a finding of a discriminatory environment will benefit 
not only the plaintiff but other employees who have been victims of discrimination in the 
workplace. Even if the plaintiff settles his or her monetary claim after j udgment, the 
finding of a discriminatory environment is  likely to result in remedial action, whether 
mandated judicially, adminis tratively, or otherwise. 
1 80 An example of the collateral effect of an adverse judgment is described in Note, 
Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5,  at 243. The author describes a hypothetical in 
which a corporate defendant loses a tort action for illegal dumping  of toxic waste. The 
defendant's reputation in the local community will be severely damaged unless the de­
fendant is able to escape the ramifications of the judgment. 
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The Nestle case provides an example of these external effects .  
The Nes tle Company sought relief from the lower court 's  finding 
that " toll house" was a generic 1 8 1  term and therefore not subj ect to 
federal trademark protection. 1 82 The trial court decision held that 
the public, including Nes tle's  competitors ,  could freely use the toll 
house name. In so holding, the court ordered the term to be re­
moved from the federal register of trademarks . 1 83 
By vacating the j udgment, the Second Circuit allowed Nes tle to 
continue to claim trademark protection for the term " toll house." 
Assuming that the toll house name was valuable (which it presuma­
bly was, based on Nestle's  s trong desire for trademark protection) , 
the free use of the toll house name would have had real conse­
quences 1 84 in the economic market for chocolate chip cookies . 1 85 
Sanctioning public use of the term allows other manufacturers to 
enhance their competition with Nestle at a much lower cost. Al­
lowing Nestle to keep the term regis tered as a trademark, in con­
trast,  effectively means that competitors not wishing to pursue 
litigation must choose a different, possibly less suitable, name for 
their product-a choice which significantly raises the market cost of 
competition.  
1 8 1 See Nestle Co.  v .  Chester's Mkt . ,  Inc . ,  756 F .2d  280 ,  28 1 ( 2d  Cir. 1 985) .  A ge-
neric word is the ordinary name by which a product or category of products is described 
in  the market .  Frequently, a name which is first used as a trademark becomes a generic 
name after the public associates the name with the generic product rather than the par­
ticular manufacturer. See, e.g. , Kellogg Co. v .  National B iscuit Co. ,  305 U .S .  1 1 1 , 1 1 6- 1 7  
( 1 938) (explanation of why the term "shredded wheat" is generic and cannot be 
trademarked) .  
1 8 2  Specifically, this protection is  provided under the Lanham Act ( the Trademark 
Act of 1 946) , ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427  (codified as amended at 1 5  U.S .C.  § §  1 05 1 - 1 1 2 7 
( 1 988) ) ,  and the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1 988 ,  Pub. L. No.  1 00-667 , 1 02 Stat .  
3935 (codified at 1 5  U .S .C .  § §  1 05 1 - 1 1 27 ( 1 988 ) ) .  Commentators have s tyled this ex­
clusive right " language monopoly." See, e.g. , W il liam M. Landes & Richrd A. Posner, 
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J .L. & EcoN. 265, 292 ( 1 987) . 
1 83 Nestle, 756 F .2d at 28 1 .  Once a mark becomes generic, section 1 4 3  of  the Lan­
ham Act provides for its cancellation . 1 5  U .S .C .  § 1 064(3) ( 1 988) . For further explana­
tion, see Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1 323 
( 1 980) . 
1 84 These consequences are not  unique to the Nestle case. The Blonder- Tongue court 
recognized that the determination of patent validity "raises issues significant to the pub­
lic as well as to the named parties . "  B londer-Tongue Labs . ,  Inc. v.  University of Il l .  
Found. ,  402 U.S. 3 1 3 ,  3 3 1 n .2 l .  Indeed, the will ingness of courts to  grant pos tsettle­
ment vacatur seriously jeopardizes the operation of the markets for intellectual prop­
erty. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,  Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to 
Innovate, 72 VA. L. REv. 677, 694-705 ( 1 986) . 
1 8 5 Readers who are unimpressed with the s ignificance of a free market for chocolate 
chip cookies may take refuge in the many cases in  this area in which l i tigation concerns 
public access to products of substantially more importance. See, e.g. , Pharmacia, Inc. v. 
Frigi tronics, Inc., No. 84- 1 923-K (D. Mass .  Jan. 1 7, 1 990 & Feb. 2 ,  1 990) (recognizing 
public interest in continued availability of chemical products for medical treatment in 
spite of judicial finding of likelihood of  patent infringement) . 
626 CORNELL LA W REVIE W [Vol .  76:589 
In addition, Nestle 's  resolution put nonlitigant competitors in an 
even worse position than if there had been no litigation.  Not only 
did the " toll house" name continue to receive trademark protection, 
but the former defendant Saccone, through the benefit of the settle­
ment agreement, was able to negotiate a trademark license agree­
ment. 1 86 By virtue of this agreement, Saccone was entitled to use 
the toll house name. Thus Saccone obtained an enhanced competi­
tive position 1 87 over third-party nonlitigants . 1 88 
Certain kinds of litigation which result in findings of illegality 
have a clear public benefit .  An example in this category is litigation 
challenging the legality of a corporation' s poison pill or o ther anti­
takeover device in connection with tender offers . An anti-takeover 
device may be illegal because it has been adopted without sufficient 
disclosure to s tockholders or provision for stockholder vote, be­
cause it conflicts with the corporation's charter, or b ecause it vio­
lates state or federal law . 1 89 Such a device does not suddenly 
become legal when a prospective purchaser drops its challenge; the 
remaining public stockholders continue to be burdened with the il­
legality. Yet vacatur may completely erase the court' s  finding of ille­
gality, effectively sanctioning the device for continued use pending 
future challenge. 
Tender offer litigation in particular is  no torious for its failure to 
proceed through the full  appellate proces s .  Often described as stra­
tegic litigation , 1 90 it frequently results in a round of m otions for pre­
liminary relief or summary j udgment.  Once rulings on those 
1 86 Nestle Co.  v. Chester's Mkt . ,  Inc . ,  596 F. Supp. 1 445,  1 446  ( D .  Conn. 1 984) . 
1 8 7  See Blonder- Tongue, 4 0 2  U .S .  at 3 4 6  (a manufacturer which obtains a favorable 
j udgment or settlement is at a competitive advantage over nonlitigant competitors) . 
1 88  The dis trict court in Nestle recognized this impact. The court noted that the ef­
fect of vacatur would be to require future competi tors who wished to use the toll house 
name to relitigate whether the term was generic. Such litigation would entail significant 
cost, a cost other competi tors might be unwilling to incur. See Nestle, 596 F. Supp. at 
1 455 .  Professor Dreyfuss recognizes the serious effect that a settlement and license 
agreement can have on the intellectual property market. Dreyfuss ,  supra note 1 84 ,  at 
694-705, explains that the patent l icensee loses the incentive to challenge the validity of 
a patent upon entering into a license agreement and thereafter has as s trong an incen­
tive as the original patentee to avoid challenges to the patent's validity, as he and the 
original owner are the only ones with a legal right of use. Thus, settlement will not only 
remove the initial finding of invalidity, but can make it more difficult to challenge the 
patent successfully. 
1 89 See, e.g. , Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc . ,  744 F .2d 255 (2d Cir.  1 984) ; Minstar 
Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc . ,  62 1 F. Supp. 1 252 (S .D .N .Y.  1 985) ;  Asarco, Inc. v .  Court, 
6 1 1 F .  Supp . 468 (D .NJ.  1 985) . See generally Note, Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or 
Gavels t, 42 VAND.  L. REv. 1 73 ( 1 989) ;  Note, Discrimination Against Shareholders in Opposing a 
Hostile Takeover, 59 S .  CAL. L. REv. 1 3 1 9  ( 1 986) . 
1 90 See, e.g. , Daniel R .  Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom " Revisited: Reflections on Recent 
Developments in Delaware 's Corporate Law, 76 Nw. U.L .  REv. 9 1 3 ,  923- 4 1  ( 1 982) ;  Michael 
Rosenzweig, Target Litigation , 85 MICH .  L. REV. 1 1 0 ( 1 986) . 
r 
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motions have clarified the bargaining positions o f  the parties,  the 
cases are settled out of court. Consequently, if parties insist on va­
catur as part of the settlement process, any clarification of the s tock­
holders ' legal rights that has resulted from the frequently quite 
costly litigation will be removed. 1 9 1 
To illus trate, in Policemen and Firemen Retirement System v. Income 
Opportunity Realty Trust ,  1 92 the court found that the defendant Trust 's  
purchase rights plan/poison pil l  was illegal . Plaintiffs ,  two public 
trust funds , then settled the litigation with an agreement that the 
Trust repurchase their shares.  The s ettlement agreement included 
a provision requiring that the court 's  findings of fact and conclu­
sions of law, including the illegality of the poison pill, be vacated.  
The dis trict court entered an appropriate order without comment. 
The settlement thus precluded other public stockholders from ben­
efitting from the j udicial finding that the poison pill was illegal . 
A famous example of judicial use of a subsequent decision for 
purposes other than collateral estoppel is presented in SEC v. Glenn 
W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 1 93 Glenn W. Turner Enterprises was found 
guilty of s ecurities fraud in an enterprise involving the sale of self­
improvement courses . The Ninth Circuit stated in its opinion: 
"The trial court's  findings . . .  demons trate that defendants'  scheme 
is a gigantic and successful fraud . " 1 94 Subsequently, the SEC 
brought suit in the Fifth Circuit against a subsidiary of Glenn Tur­
ner for securities fraud arising out of a cosmetics enterprise-SEC v. 
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 1 95 The enterprise was different in the sec­
ond case, and therefore collateral estoppel did not apply. The Fifth 
Circuit benefitted, however, from the Ninth Circuit's opinion includ­
ing its findings as to the method of operation employed by the 
Glenn Turner companies . 1 96 According to the Fifth Circuit: 
Our task is greatly simplified by the Ninth Circuit's decision 
in SEC v .  Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,  Inc., supra . The promo­
tional s cheme confronting the Ninth Circuit  is largely paralleled 
1 9 1 Unless the settlement requires the tender offeror to reimburse the target com-
pany for its attorney's fees, the cost of tender offer litigation including expedi ted pro­
ceedings , extensive discovery, and the most expensive legal talent will be borne by the 
target company. As a result, the target 's  s tockholders indirectly pay for these "s trate­
gic" legal battles. 
1 92 No. C-89- 1 1 52  (AJZ) (N.D.  CaL May 1 6, 1 989) . 
1 93 474 F .2d 476 (9th Cir. ) , cert. denied, 4 1 4  U . S .  82 1 ( 1 973) .  
1 94 !d. at 4 78 .  
1 9 5 497 F .2d 473 (5th Cir. 1 974) . 
1 96 I t  should be noted that it was the Ninth Circui t ' s  opinion that was of value to the 
Fifth Circui t .  A decision by the Ninth Circuit to vacate its judgment in Glenn Tumer but 
not to vacate the opinion would have preserved the s tare decisis effect that was of use to 
the later court. 
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Thus , even though the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Glenn Turner lacked 
collateral estoppel effect, i t  had o ther collateral consequences of 
public value.  
An unsuccessful civil litigant may also suffer direct and serious 
consequences which extend beyond the judgment itself. S tatutes 
and regulations governing filing, disclosure, and licensing fre­
quently recognize the significance of an adverse civil judgment by 
requiring disclosure of certain such judgments .  For example, in 
some filings required by the federal securities laws,  filing p arties 
must disclose adverse civil judgments involving inj unctions or viola­
tions of the federal or s tate securities laws. 1 98 An adverse civil judg­
ment may also preven t  an applicant from registering as a broker­
dealer under the federal s ecurities laws. 1 99 In addition,  a civil judg­
ment based on a finding of willful violation of the fed eral securities 
laws might furnish the basis for a Rule 2 (e) 200 proceeding or even 
for disbarment . 20 1 
Consideration of the consequences of erasing such j udicial de­
cisions illus trates the public cost of vacatur. It is certainly arguable 
that vacated judgments should be disclosed under federal s ecurities 
laws . Disclosure is probably not legally mandated, h ow ever, since 
the vacated judgment "is of no further force and effect .  "202 Accord-
1 97 Kosco/, 497 F .2d at 484 .  
1 98 See Instructions to Schedule 1 3D ,  l 3E-3,  1 7 C.F .R .  § §  240. 1 3d- 1 0 1  to . l 3e- l 00 
( 1 990) . 
1 99 In  particular, 1 7  C .F .R .  § 249.50 l a  requires applicants for registration as a bro­
ker-dealer to file SEC Form BD. In completing this form, the applicant must disclose, 
inter alia, whether i t  has ever been found to be " involved in a violation of investment­
related statutes or regulations ."  Form BD; Question B (2) . Section 1 5 (b) (4) of the Se­
curities Exchange Act permits the SEC to deny or revoke regis tration if it finds that an 
applicant has willfully violated the federal securities laws. 1 5  U .S .C .  § 78o(b) (4) (A) - (F) 
( 1 990) . See, e.g. , Capital Funds , Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir .  1 965) (upholding 
SEC's decision to deny registration as a broker-dealer based on applicants' previous 
violation of the securities laws) . 
200 Rule 2 (e) of the SEC Rules of Practice provides : 
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of 
appearing or practicing before i t  in any way to any person who is found 
by the Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the 
matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, 
or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethi­
cal or improper professional conduct. 
1 7  C .F .R.  § 20 1 .2 (e) ( 1 990) . 
20 1  CJ. In the Matter of Paul M .  Kaufman, Securities Exchange Act Release No.  3-
2 1 1 3  Uuly 2 ,  1 970) . 
202 For example, the Ins tructions to SEC Schedule ! 3D,  Item I (e) require the filing 
party to disclose: 
Whether or not, during the last five years, such person was a party to a 
civil proceeding of a judicial or adminis trative body of competent juris­
diction and as a result of such proceeding was or is subject to a j udgment, 
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ingly, a litigant who successfully obtains vacatur may be spared the 
burden of disclosure, the difficulty of obtaining regis tration,  and all 
other collateral consequences of an adverse decision . 
C .  Additional Public Costs o f  Vacatur 
In addition to having party-specific impacts, postjudgment va­
catur may sacrifice certain public values .203 A balancing of the costs 
of settlement against the costs of vacatur must weigh these values as 
well .  The most commonly cited public value is the precedential 
value of the prior decision.204 A judgment includes elements of 
legal analysis which may have important consequences in other 
cases involving unrelated parties .  For this reason, judicial decisions 
are published in case reporters .205 The common-law legal system in 
the United S tates is based on the premise that previously decided 
cases have a public value in elucidating the law for future actors , as 
decree or  final order enj oining future violations of  . . .  or finding any 
violation with respect to [federal or  s tate securities laws ] .  
17  C .F .R .  § 240. 1 3d- 1 0 1  ( 1 990) . 
203 These values are impacted even more when a court vacates its judgment but 
leaves the opinion intact.  See supra note 28. 
204 Though limited precedential value is an effect of vacatur, it is unlikely that this 
effect imposes a substantial societal cost. Most vacatur decisions occur at the dis trict 
court level, where a decision has limited, if any, precedential value anyway. To the ex­
tent that a decision represents a groundbreaking legal analysis ,  such a decision can be 
ci ted for its persuasive impact even if vacated. See, e.g. , County of Los Angles v .  Davis,  
440 U.S. 625,  646 n . l 0 ( 1 979) (Powell ,  j. ,  dissenting) (vacated opinion continues to have 
precedential weight if  not reversed on the merits) ; Holliday v. Consol . Rail Corp . ,  9 1 4 
F.2d 42 1 ,  423 (3d Cir. 1 990) ; Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp . ,  870 F.2d 
1 292,  1 298 (7th Cir .  1 989) (citing a vacated decision as " the most comprehensive source 
of guidance available on the [questions at issue] ") ;  United States ex rel Espinoza v. Fair­
man, 8 1 3  F.2d 1 1 7 ,  1 25 n.7 (7th Cir. ) ,  cert. denied, 483 U .S .  1 0 1 0 ( 1 987) (relying on 
analysis of decision vacated by Supreme Court as persuasive precedent) ; see also Note, 
Settlement Pending Appeal, supra note 5 ,  at 246 n .9 1 .  But see Mason Tenders Dist .  Council 
Welfare Fund v .  Akaty Constr. Corp . ,  7 24 F. Supp. 209, 2 1 9 n. l O  (S .D .N.Y .  1 989) (rely­
ing on vacated decision not because of its precedential value but because the prior 
judge's analysis was "thorough, incisive and ultimately persuasive") ,  opinion withdrawn 
from bound volume at request of the court. 
205 Those scholars who contend that the utility of published decisions is iimi ted to 
decisions of appellate courts might reconsider upon recollecting the large number of 
trial court opinions which are published annually. See, e.g. , jOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & 
DAVID s .  CLARK , COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 585 ( 1 978) (" [T]he extent to which and the manner in which judicial decisions 
are published and made available for use in research reflect their true position and func­
tion in the legal system.") ;  H .  Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, 
and Implied Pnvate Actions in the State and Federal Cow·ts, 7 1  CoRNELL L. REv. SO l ,  508-09 
n .25 ( 1 986) (reporting and publication of judicial opinions permit development and en­
forcement of stare decisis doctrine) ; William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The 
Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts 
oJAppeals, 78 COLUM . L. REv. 1 1 67,  1 1 8 1 -85 ( 1 978) (published decisions and the role of 
s tare decisis establish the content of the law itself) . 
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Indeed, one of the social values of litigation is the resolution of 
uncertainty in the law. This resolution is important not  merely for 
its legal effect in subsequent lawsuits,  but for its s ocial impact as 
well . 2°7 Judicial decisions influence our perception o f  what is right 
and wrong. A decision like that in Brown v. Board of Education 208 de­
cides more than the issue of the legality of a s e gregated public 
s chool system in Kansas.209 
Although a vacated decision may remain in the case report­
ers,2 1 0  its precedential value i s  extremely limited.  One reason for 
this is the difficulty of determining the basis for the decision to va­
cate. As discussed previously, a court may vacate a decision for 
many reasons that go to the actual validity of the decision, such as 
fraud , mistake, or newly discovered evidence. A litigant citing a va­
cated decision cannot be sure that the court did not vacate based on 
s econd thoughts about the legitimacy of the legal rulings . No gui­
dance exis ts for subsequent courts as to the reasons for vacatur, and 
accordingly, courts view vacated decisions with s uspicion.  2 1 1  
206 Part of the justification for public financing of the j udicial system is  the public 
value derived from the resolution of private disputes . Indeed, commentators have re­
cently begun to question the legitimacy of shielding disputes resolved through settle­
ment from public scrutiny. Such commentators argue that maintaining the secrecy of a 
settlement has adverse impacts upon other similarly si tuated actors and upon the pub­
lic 's right to know. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Chief judge of New York Urges Less Secrecy in Civil 
Settlements, N .Y. Times, June 20 ,  1 990,  at A 1 ,  col. 3 (N.Y. Chief Judge Sol  Wachtler and 
others advocate giving the public greater access to the records of civil cases which have 
been settled. " 'I think that when you have the courts being used for redressing a 
wrong, it is the public that is providing and paying for the court procedure and making it 
available for private litigants . ' " !d. at A 1 ,  col .  4 (quoting Chief Judge Wachtler) ) .  
207 A n  untested law o r  legal theory may have a chilling effect on t h e  actions o f  nonli­
tigants. Thus the cost of forgoing a judicial interpretation of that law may include the 
costs associated with restraint of conduct because of its uncertain legality. See Don B .  
Kates, Jr. & William T. Barker, Mootness in judicial Proceedings: Towm·d a Coherent Theory , 62 
CALIF. L. REv. 1 385 ,  1429-3 1 ( 1 974) (arguing that these social costs are particularly high 
when the issues involve personal liberties, freedom of expression,  or entitlement to so­
cial welfare benefits) . 
208 347 U .S .  483 ( 1 954) ,  supplemented by 349 U .S .  294 ( 1 95 5 ) .  Brown is clearly an 
extreme example; most decisions lack its social significance. The constitutional law text­
books are replete, however, with cases which have revised social consciousness. See, e.g. , 
Roe v. Wade, 4 1 0 U .S .  1 1 3 ( 1 973) (abortion rights) ;  Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 1 U.S .  
479 ( 1 965) (constitutional right to privacy) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U .S .  398 ( 1 963) 
(free exercise of religion) .  
209 Professor Fiss describes Brown a s  a case "in which the judicial power i s  used to 
eradicate the caste s tructure. "  Fiss, supra note 8, at 1 089. 
2 1 0  A case vacated prior to publication of the bound reporter volume will generally 
be omitted from that volume, causing that case to appear only in the advance sheets . 
2 1 I Courts could resolve this problem by s tating explici tly the grounds for vacatur 
whenever they grant a motion to vacate, as they currently do when cases become unre­
viewable due to mootness .  See, e.g. , Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson,  442 U .S .  92 , 93 
( 1 979) . 
1 99 1 ]  SETTLEJV!ENT AND VACA TUR 63 1 
In Memorial Hospital, Judge Easterbrook cites a public interes t in 
the respect for and integrity of the courts . 2 1 2 Finality of judgments 
is an important component of the credibility of the j udicial process .  
A p erception that a party with sufficient resources can manipulate 
the finality of judgments fos ters a diminished respect for the institu­
tion which allows such manipulation.2 1 3  To the extent that courts 
sanction the use of settlement conditioned on vacatur and provide 
automatic vacatur on demand, few rational litigants are likely to de­
cline the invitation. With vacatur as a routine procedure, the trial is 
converted from a method of dispute resolution into a first-round 
estimate of the parties' rights-a sort of nonbinding arbitration .2 1 4 
Equally important is Judge Easterbrook's concern that public 
acts by public officials become bargaining chips in the s ettlement 
negotiation .2 1 5  Such a result engenders disrespect for the j udicial 
process.  In addition, it allows parties to avoid adverse decisions 
based on the financial ability to buy their way out. 2 1 6 This practice 
takes the New Yorker cartoon query, " How much j ustice can you 
afford ? , " 2 1 7 to a new level. If a j udicial system in which the rights of 
the parties are likely to depend more on their finances than on legal 
merit is to be condemned, a system in which wealthy litigants can 
use the process simply as a nonbinding gambling procedure is 
equally abhorrent. 
Advocates of the public law model of litigation recognize that 
private litigation may have socially valuable consequences . These 
consequences may be recognized less as a cost to the losing litigant 
than as a boon to society through the acceptance of change in our 
social structure. 2 1 8 The value of certain j udicial decisions to society 
2 1 2 Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs . ,  862 F.2d 
1 299,  1 302 (7th Cir .  1 988) .  
2 1 3 Moreover, because of the largely invisible nature of the vacatur process and the 
fact that vacated decisions may be physically removed from the record books, see supra 
note 1 63 ,  the practice of permitting vacatur assumes the guise of a furtive tool for re­
moving judicial facts from public scrutiny. 
2 1 4 The judgment does have a real effect on the legal entit lements of the parties ; this 
effect will require the party desiring vacatur to pay for it. The relevant distinction is not 
between the parties' positions before and after a j udgment is rendered, but between 
l itigants who have negotiated a contractual resolution of their legal rights and those who 
have had those rights resolved by judicial decree. 
2 1 5 Afemorial Hosp. , 862 F.2d at 1 302.  
2 1 6 In effect, the parties have obtained a highly authoritative advisory opinion at  
publ ic expense. 
2 1 7 J .B .  Handelsman, THE NEw YoRKER, Dec. 24 ,  1973, at 52 (caption to cartoon 
showing lawyer with potential client: "You have a pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin .  How 
much justice can you afford ?") . 
2 1 8 Some view lit igation as a negative sum game, meaning that the overall u ti l ity 
value of a lawsuit is negative, because one party's gain is the other party's loss ,  assuming 
both parties expend lit igation costs . See, e.g. , Thomas E .  Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, 
An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and Independently lniti-
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as a whole may far exceed the cost to the individual losing litigant in 
the action. Thus,  a court does a disservice when it decides to vacate 
based solely on an analysis of the individual litigants' costs and 
benefits.  
IV 
THE COST OF VACATUR IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
Judge Easterbrook' s  concern about the use of vacatur as a bar­
gaining chip is worthy of further exploration, especially in view of 
the perception of courts , such as the Nestle court, that the public 
value of encouraging settlement is furthered by allowing vacatur at 
the parties ' request .  
A .  T h e  Economic Model of t h e  Settlement Decision 
As commentators have observed,2 1 9 the decision o f  a litigant to 
settle rather than continue to trial is based on a process of evaluat­
ing litigation as an investment opportunity. More s pecifically, the 
settlement decision is based on an evaluation of the expected j udg­
ment and the cost of securing that judgment, weighed against the 
value of the proposed settlement. The litigant evaluates the deci­
sion to settl e  based on his or her expected financial c ondition at the 
conclusion of the litigation.  This may be described as a function of 
the expected judgment, the probability of obtaining that judgment, 
and the costs of obtaining that j udgment.  Assuming that the costs 
of litigating are independent of the litigation result,220 the outcome 
may be quantified as: 
V = }2� p (n)j (n) - c(t) , where 
V = the expected value to be obtained at the conclusion of the 
Etigation;22 1 
a ted Cases Compared, 74 CEO. LJ. 1 1 63 , 1 1 70 ( 1 986) . This view of  the l i tigation process is 
overly simplist ic ,  because i t  focuses on s traightforward disputes over money damages 
and does not consider the costs and values of injunctive and o ther equitable relief. 
Moreover, the public law model recognizes that, through the vehicle of social change, 
litigation may have a positive value to society. 
2 1 9  See sources cited supra note 2 1 .  
220 This assumption, although useful in order to simplify the analysis ,  is concededly 
!.m realistic.  The costs of litigating clearly bear a direct relationship to the expected judg­
ment .  For example, obtaining damages for loss of expected earnings m ay be impossible 
without the introduction of expert testimony. The costs of litigating are more accurately 
represemed as c(n) (t) , the further litigation cost of obtaining a particular judgment J (n) 
at time L For simplicity's sake, the analysis in this Article will ignore the possibility that 
costs mv.y vary as a function of  the expected judgment. 
2 2  i This vaiue need not be viewed simply in terms of a damage remedy. This 
formula may also describe l itigation seeking equitable relief, with the vaiue in such a 
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J (n) = the range of possible j udgments , with each j being one pos si­
ble j udgment; 
p (n) = the probability of obtaining a given judgment J (n) ; and 
c (t) = the cost of continuing to pursue the litigation to its conclu­
sion at any given time t (rather than settling or voluntarily discontin­
uing the lawsuit) . 
The progress of any litigation can be viewed as the continued 
acquisition of additional information about the probability of 
achieving the various possible jud gments . Thus, as a litigant goes 
through the discovery process, his assessment of the values of p ( l )  
through p (n) changes,  and his assessment o f  the value of his claim 
may also change. 222 
A rational litigant223 will s ettle a l awsuit if, at any point during 
the lawsuit, he has the opportunity to settle for an amount greater 
than or equal to V. Because the calculation of V by each litigant is 
independent, there may, in a lawsuit, be a range of amounts for 
which both litigants would be willing to settle .  Conversely, i t  is pos­
sible that the litigants ' expectations as to the outcome of the litiga­
tion are so different that there is no s ettlement amount accep table 
to both of them. 
To take a simple example, assume that plaintiff (P) and defen­
dant (D) are litigating a products liability claim . P's complaint al­
leges $1 00,000 in damages .  D has interposed no counterclaims and 
there is no prospect of punitive damages .  The range of possible 
j udgments at the outset of the case is $0 to $ 1 00,000. Based on his 
initial evaluation, P may assign a probability of 25% to full  recovery, 
a probability of 50 % to obtaining a judgment of $50,000, and a 
case representing the cost or benefit of such relief. For example, a party seeking to have 
a trademark regis tration declared invalid may expect a declaration of invalidity to be 
worth $500,000, representing perhaps a savings in  l icensing fees. I f  the trademark is  
upheld, the party's expected value of the l i tigation is zero. 
222  The calculation performed by the other l it igant is  identical. A judgment in favor 
of a litigant's adversary may be reflected as a negative number. For example, i f  defen­
dant calculates that plaintiff will obtain a judgment of $ 1 00,000, then defendant will 
insert this in his calculation as -$ 1 00,000 . It should be noted that the l i tigants '  estimates 
of relative probabili ty of various outcomes may not coincide. Thus, the plaintiff may 
believe his chances of recovery are good, and may set the probability of obtaining a 
$ 1 00,000 recovery at 50% . The defendant may believe there is no merit to plaintiff's 
claims. Accordingly, the defendant may estimate the probability of a $ 1 00,000 judg­
ment in the plaintiff's favor at 5 % .  
223 O f  course, a l itigant may have personal characteris tics which affect this decision. 
If, for example, a litigant is risk averse, he will prefer an action which achieves $ 1 000 
with 1 00% probability to an action which achieves $ 1 000 of expected value, based on a 
50% probability of acquiring $2000 and a 50% probabil ity of acquiring nothing. A risk 
avers e li tigant will therefore be inclined to settle a t  some amount lower than V (i. e. , the 
expected value to be obtained at  the conclusion of l it igation ) ,  based on his  perception 
that a bird in the hand is worth more than two or more birds in the bush. Other factors 
such as insurance coverage may also affect the decision to settle. 
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probability of 25% to obtaining a j udgment of $ 0 .  Further assume 
that P expects to spend $5000 on the discovery and pretrial process 
and an additional $5000 if the case goes to trial . A rational P would 
be willing to settle at the outset of the litigation for $40,000, which 
is the sum of p (n)j (n) - $ 1 0,000 . 224 
D ' s  calculation of expected outcome may be different .  Indeed, 
at the outset of litigation, D may believe there is zero probability of 
a judgment of $ 1 00,000, only a 40 % probability of a $ 5 0 ,000 j udg­
ment, and a large probability (60 % )  that the plaintiff will be com­
pletely unsuccessful .  Assuming that i t  will also cost D $ 1 0 ,000 to 
litigate, D may then calculate the expected outcome as -$30,000.  
Since D will not offer more in settlement than his cal culation of the 
expected outcome, D and P will be unable to settle at this time. 
Proceeding through the discovery process may change P's cal­
culation, however. Through reviewing documents and taking depo­
sitions,  P may learn that his chance of recovering $ 1 00 ,000 is in fact 
zero , and that he is much more likely to recovery only $ 2 5 ,000 . P 
may be forced to reevaluate and may discover that his expected re­
covery will be only $20 ,000. 225 P will now be willing to settle for a 
lower amount than at the start of the litigation.  If D has not 
changed his calculations ,226 there is a range of s ettlement amounts 
for which agreement is possible-$20,000 to $25 ,000. 227 
As the litigation proceeds and discovery provides more infor­
mation about the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party's  
2 24 The calculation goes as follows : 
j ( l )  = $ 1 00 ,000 p ( l )  = . 25  c(t) = 1 0 ,000 where t l  is 
J (2) = $50,000 p(2) = .50 the outset of the l itigation 
J (3)  = $0 p(3)  = . 25  
. 25($ 1 00,000) + .50 ($50,000) + . 25 ($0) - $5000 - $5000 = $40 ,000 
If  the calculation is made at a subsequent point in the l i tigation, the expected cost c(t) of 
bringing the l itigation to a conclusion will  decrease by the amount already spent. Thus 
if P considers settlement after expending $5000 in litigation costs,  c(2) wiil  equal $5000.  
P will add that expenditure to his equation. Therefore, P will  not  sett le for less than 
$45,000. 
225 That figure assumes that P's discovery process reveals the following: 
j ( l )  = $ 1 00 ,000 p( l )  = 0 
J (2)  = $50,000 p (2) = . 25  
J (3) = $0 p(3) = . 25  
j (4)  = $25 ,000 p (4)  = . 50  
The calculation i s  as follows : 
0 ($ J 00,000) + . 25 ($50,000) + . 25 ($0) + . 50($25 ,000) - $5,000'; = $20,000 
•:• the cost of proceeding from the present stage to the conclusion of the l it igation.  
22 6  Note that D's expected outcome must now reflect the expenditure o f  $5000 in 
expected litigation costs ,  so that V = .40(-$50,000) + .60($0) - $5000 = -$25,000. 
227 This scenario may be complica ted by the fact that a party's settlement negotia­
tion is based not only on his expectation of the value of the litigation, but on his assess· 
ment of the other party's bargaining position. Thus, a party' s  perception of the other 
side's l it igation costs, economic constraints,  or risk aversion might influence his decision 
to settle. 
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case,  both parties will probably be able to ascertain the expected 
outcome with greater certainty. Large litigation costs,  however, may 
cause a party to be more reluctant to settle as the litigation pro­
gresses, because settlement cannot avoid those costs once spent. 
This phenomenon has caused some commentators to conclude that 
the litigation process operates in a counter-intuitive manner, that is ,  
larger litigation costs may actually result in diminished likelihood of 
s ettlement. 228 
Of course,  the parties have the most information about the ex­
p ected outcome after trial . 229 Once a verdict has been reached, the 
parties can evaluate the probable outcome with a great deal of cer­
tainty, subj ect only to the variables engendered by the possibility of 
reversal or reduction in the amount of a damage award . 230 Such 
variables entail much less uncertainty than parties ' prejudgment as­
sessments, especially since the likelihood of having the case re­
versed on appeal is small .  23 1 
B .  The Model Refined : Collateral Consequences and the 
Availability of Vacatur 
The calculation described above does not account for the col­
lateral costs of a judgment, costs which the parties may incur in an 
asymmetrical manner. For example, assume that a j udicial finding 
that D's  product was defective can b e  used against D by subsequent 
plaintiffs under the doctrine of offensive collateral es toppel . The 
cost of losing this litigation must now reflect not only the cost of the 
228  See, e.g. , Linda R .  Stanley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on  The Selection 
Hypothesis and The Deci.swn to Litigate or Settle, 1 9  J. LEGAL STUD. 1 45 ,  1 63 ( 1 990) ; Gordon 
Tullock, Negotiated Settlement ,  in LAw & EcoNOMICS AND THE EcoNOMICS OF LEGAL REGU­
LATION 39 (Goren Skogh & J. Malthias Graf von der Schulenburg eds. 1 986) . 
2 2 9 The use of ADR methods ,  such as the summary jury trial , is premised on the 
theory that, by providing l i tigants with sufficient information on the merits of the l i tiga­
tion, seulement can be achieved without the provision of a full trial .  See Wayne D. Bra­
zi l ,  What Lawyers Want From judges in the Settlement Arena ,  1 06 F.R.D.  85 ( 1 985) ;  Posner, 
supra note 6 .  A s tudy conducted by the American Bar Association found that 85% of the 
lawyers surveyed viewed the participation of judges in settlement discussions as li\ely to 
significantly improve the prospects for achieving settlement. See Brazil, supra , at 8 5 .  
This perception was n o  doubt based, i n  part, o n  the fact that participation b y  judges is 
l ikely to result in expressions of the judge's  opinions of  the case-opinions which law­
yers view as most valuable in encouraging settlement .  !d. at 87 .  Access by l i tigants to a 
j udge's opinion of the litigation allows the l i tigants to evaluate the prospects of success 
with more accuracy, confidence, and certainty. 
2 30 As a practical matter, a verdict may thus increase the poss ibil ity of settlement by 
giving the parties a reasonably accurate description of the value of the plaintiiT's  claim .  
Therefore, a plaintiff who steadfastly maintained that h i s  lawsuit would result in a multi­
million dollar verdict may be more amenable to settlement overtures after the jury ren­
ders a $50 ,000 verdict .  Similarly, a defendant who s tubbornly disclaims liabil ity during 
discovery may reconsider after the trial court rejects his position. 
23 1 See supra note 25 .  
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j udgment in this case, but the cost of expected future j udgments 
(multiplied by the probability that D will be found liable) . This cost 
is reflected in D's calculation of expected value232 but not in P's cal­
culation, as the fu ture litigation between D and third p arties will not 
affect P.  Therefore, the possibility of additional plaintiffs will be a 
s trong inducement for D to settle and thereby avoid the risk of such 
collateral effects . Indeed, D may be willing to settle in s ituations 
where the amount he expects to pay in the ins tan t lawsuit is quite 
small , based on the risk posed by subsequent litigation.  233 If, how­
ever, D has the option of buying his way out of the judgment and its 
collateral effects through posti udgment settlement and vacatur, he 
is unlikely to settle. 234 D will be willing to take his chances on this 
l awsuit because, if he loses,  a rational P would accept  his tender of 
the value of the j udgment in return for forgoing the costs of an ap­
peal. 235 If the court permits vacatur, D will be no worse off than if 
he settled before trial at P's asking price (which D believed to be 
overly high) and may be affirmatively better off if he is successful at 
trial . 
Vacatur thus becomes an important aspect o f  D ' s  p retrial evalu­
ation of the prospects of settlement .  Absent the p o ssib ility of vaca­
tur, D will be s trongly inclined to settle the litigation prior to trial , 
thereby avoiding the possible collateral effects of an adverse judg­
ment. 236 If D can reasonably anticipate that the court will grant a 
postiudgment motion to vacate, D may be indifferent to the timing 
of the settlement or even disposed toward waiting until after trial to 
232 D's  formula might be adj usted to read: 
V = 2." p(n)J (n) - c( t) - K(n) 
I 
where K(n) represents the collateral costs to the defendant of a particular judgment]  (n) . 
233 For example, consider the calculation if D assumes a l 0 %  probabil i ty of liabil­
ity-damages of $50 ,000 in this case-but is aware that there are 1 00 similarly si tuated 
plaintiffs , with potential damages totalling $5 ,000,000: 
V(for this case) = . 1 0 (-$50,000) + .90 ($0) - $ 1 0 ,000 = -$ 1 5,000; 
V(for the future cases) = . 1 0 (-$5 ,000,000) + .90($0) - $ 1 00,000* = -600,000. 
* I t  is likely that the l it igation costs would be substantially reduced if  D w e r e  to litigate 
this issue l 00 times. 
234 The reader may observe that this argument risks substantial overstatement of the 
effect that vacatur may have on a settlement decision. The relevant inquiry, as framed 
by the Nestle opinion, is  not whether vacatur is  likely to be a substan tial factor in the 
li tigants' decision to settle, but rather, if vacatur is a factor, whether a rule such as the 
Nestle rule actually works to encourage settlement. 
2 3 5 Indeed, if the defendant tenders the ful l  amount awarded the plaintiff, and the 
plaintiff does not intend to challenge the verdict as insufficient, there is no longer a 
controversy between the parties . 
236 A pretrial settlement will  also allow D to avoid the significant iitigation costs 
associa ted with a trial and the uncertainty of the jury verdic t .  
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attempt to settle,237 because such a decision will not be costly .238 
The foregoing analysis illustrates a fundamental flaw in the rea­
soning of the Nestle court and those who advocate routine vacatur of 
judgments . Although vacatur will permit the parties to s ettle after 
judgment in the above example, it will encourage settlement at a 
much later stage in the action.239 Rather than encouragin g  settle­
ment, vacatur in fact is operating to encourage speculative litigation 
because the potentially unfavorable results of litigation can be 
avoided . Even where litigation at the trial level has resolved a com­
plex legal issue, the availability of vacatur encourages parties to at­
tempt to manipulate the legal sys tem through s ettlement 
conditioned on vacatur. 
In addition, the approach of the Second Circuit in Nestle creates 
a frivolous distinction between litigants who choose to file an appeal 
and those who simply decide to settle or otherwise comply with the 
d ecision of the lower court.240 Under the Second Circuit 's  :rule, 
only the former are entitled to vacatur. Litigants who "voluntarily" 
give up their right to appeal are not entitled to vacatur under Sec-
23 7 See Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep ' t  of Health & Human Ser;s . ,  862 F.2d 
1 299, 1 302 (7th Cir .  1 988) (denying vacatur as a matter of course encourages parties to 
sett le  prior to the district court decision) . 
238 Though the decision to wait until after judgment may not be particularly costly 
to  the defendant, delaying settlement results in  real costs to both the plaintiff and soci­
ety. The plaintiff incurs legal costs in l i tigating at  the trial level which he may never 
recover. See Fiss, supra note 8,  at I 076. If, for example, a plaintiff correctly perceives the 
ultimate judgment to be $ 1 00 ,000, but must expend $50,000 of legal costs to obtain that 
j udgment, he will be better off settling the case for any amount greater than �;50 ,000. 
The difFerence between the settlement value and the expected value after l i t igation rep­
resents a real gain to the plaintiff. After trial (and expenditure of the $50,000 in legal 
costs) ,  the plain tiff can no longer recoup that gain ,  even if he wins a $ 1 00 ,000 judgment. 
Society loses because the court's time (of which the Second Circuit and o thers are so 
solicitous) has already been used in arriving at  the trial court judgment .  In short,  judi­
cial resources have been invested in this judgment. See Memorial Hosp. , 862 F .2d at 1 302;  
Fiss ,  supm note 8 ,  at 1 085.  
239 This is particularly true in cases in  which a losing party is likely to seek vacatur: 
cases in which the legal or factual issues are sufficiently complex that i t  is  difficult to 
predict the outcome of the litigation, and in which there is a reasonable possibility that a 
second court might not reach the same result .  Such complexity complicates the parties' 
calculation of the expected value of the l itigation and increases the difficulty of reaching 
a pretriai agreement on such a value. A pretrial settlement at a value that both panies 
view as reasonable may be impossible to achieve, given the substantial difference.> in the 
parties'  expectations of the l i tigation outcome. Although a judgment gives the winning 
plaintiff a (rela tively) clear entitlement to a judgment, thus greatly enhancing the piain­
t iff's  bargaining position, that entitlement may be worth far less than the plaintiff -:-x­
pected to obtain. Rather than serving as a floor for a subsequent settlement C<mount, t.he 
verdict tends to operate, in such a case, as a ceiling. 
2,10 Indeed, approaches lixe that of the Second Circuit ,  coupled with the CAMP pro­
gram, may directly cause the filing of additional appeals .  At least one commentator has 
expressly criticized the Second Circuit's program for this reason. See J .  GoLDMAN, supra 
note 6. 
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ond Circuit law. 24 1 Thus in Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, the 
court vacated that part of the district court j udgment which upheld 
the LIP A Act but did not vacate the part of the j udgment which de­
clared the Used and Useful Act uncons titutional .242 According to 
the court, the plaintiff was entitled to vacatur because it had rein­
stated its appeal before the case was rendered moot by s ettlement. 
By contrast,  the defendants , who had not reinstated their appeals , 
lost both the decision upholding the validity of the LIPA Act and the 
right to defend the Used and Useful Act against constitutional 
challenge. 
The reasoning in Cuomo suggests that there is a m eaningful dis­
tinction between litigants which file an appeal before s ettlement and 
those who do not.  Such a distinction has no clear connection to the 
Nestle court's rationale of encouraging settlement. All the court is 
doing in cases like Cuomo is encouraging losing litigants to com­
mence an appeal before signing a s ettlement agreement.  The real 
result of the automatic vacatur rule is to require litigants to consume 
j udicial resources by initiating the appellate process in order to ac­
cess the vacatur proces s .  As the court warned in United States v. 
Garde: "vVe do not wish to encourage litigants who are dissatisfied 
with the decision of the trial court ' to have them wiped from the 
books' by merely filing an appeal, then complying with the order or 
j udgment below and petitioning for vacatur of the adverse trial 
court decision. "243 
Moreover, viewing the settlement process as a negotiation 
based on expected economic consequences illustrates that the Nestle 
court's concern that denying vacatur will thwart conditional settle­
ments is misplaced. If courts choose to dis tinguish between condi­
tional and unconditional settlements , a rational losing litigant will 
always require the settlement agreement to be conditioned on vaca­
tur, a requirement that should be of no consequence to his adver­
sary. If the courts instead follow the lead of the S econd Circuit244 
and grant vacatur where the settlement agreement is uncondi­
tional ,245 the courts will have no basis for determining the effect of 
vacatur on the settlement process;  that is ,  it will be impossible to 
ascertain whether a case will nonetheless be settled if the court de-
24 1 See Blackwelder v .  Safnauer, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1 9!39) ( refusing to vacate dis­
trict court judgment as moot where losing lit igant took no appeal) . 
242 888 F.2d 230, 234 n .5  (2d Cir .  1 989) . 
243 848 F .2d 1 307 ,  1 3 1 1 (D.C. Cir. 1 988) (citing Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. West­
ern Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 72 1 & n. l (9th Cir. 1 982 ) ) .  
2 4 4  See Cuomo , 888  F .2d  at  234  (holding that i t  i s  the appellate court's "duty" to 
vacate the dis trict court judgment from which an appeal was taken ) .  
24 5  See supra note 7 7 .  
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nies vacatur. 246 
C .  Another Look a t  the Costs o f  Vacatur 
639 
Under either analysis, vacatur becomes an important bargain­
ing chip in the settlement negotiation. In addition to the normal 
settlement topics such as the amount of payment, the nature of any 
releases, and negotiations relating to future business dealings, the 
litiga::-:ts may now negotiate the subj ect of vacatur. In the negotia­
tion, the winning litigant is at  a distinct advantage; he has little to 
lose if the case is not settled and incurs no personal cos t  by con­
s enting to vacatur. Because vacatur is very important to the other 
side, his bargaining position is greatly enhanced. 247 
Indeed , a rational and informed P will perceive that the value of 
postj udgment :::ettlement is asymmetrical, i. e. , D will suffer dispro­
portionately by P's refusal to settle. Consequently, P may be able to 
negotiate a settlement which is higher than the expected outcome, 
based on his awareness of D's need to avoid the collateral conse­
quences of the j udgment .248 This additional value to P is a windfall 
which reflects the value to D of avoiding the collateral consequences 
of the j udgment.  If one assumes that the collateral consequences 
are not only an inconvenience to D but also an affirmative benefit to 
society, P has appropriated part of the societal value of the judg­
ment for his personal gain .  249 
This raises an additional issue: if the public loses when a final 
judgment is vacated after settlement, who gains ?  Cases such as Nes­
tle suggest that the availability of vacatur creates a societal gain in 
the increased number of settlements . As the foregoing analysis has 
demonstrated, vacatur does not encourage settlement; if anything, it  
discourages it by allowing a party to gamble on two rolls of the dice 
at the cost of one. By allowing a litigant to erase the adverse effect 
of a trial, vacatur encourages even the settlement-inclined litigant to 
246 Conversely, the courts will be granting vacatur in cases where it is manifestly 
unnecessary to obtain a settlement. 
24  7 One of the problems with settlement as a means of resolving dis pUles is  the pos­
sibil ity that settlement may be coerced by the party with greater access to information or 
resources. In addition, to the extent that a party' s  willingness to settle is  a function of 
the resources available to that party, the coerciveness of the settlement process contin­
ues to be a factor after a trial court judgment. A poor plaintiff who has been successful 
a t  trial may be unwill ing to fund a defense of that judgment or to hold out through the 
appellate process before receiving payment. See Fiss, supra ncte 8,  at 1 075-76.  
248 See supra notes 232-33.  
249 See Village Escrow v.  National Union Fire Ins .  Co. ,  202 Cal .  App. 3d 1 309, 248 
Cal .  Rptr. 687,  696 ( 1 988) (losing l i tigant offered prevailing party substantial amount of 
money to settle case,  coupled with "an express threat that the prevail ing party would 
lose the promised money if this court filed an opinion") .  
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wait until after trial . 250 
The beneficiaries of the sys tem are actually b o th of the original 
parties . The losing party gains by achieving control over the litiga­
tion proces s ;  the winning party gains an opportunity to appropriate 
p art of the societal value of final judgments for its own benefit. But 
the vacatur process is ,  at best,  a zero sum game .25 1 If b o th the par­
ties to the vacatur decision gain, the public loses . 
The foregoing analysis compels the conclusion that the decision 
to vacate should not be left to individual litigants . Although the de­
cision to l itigate may be a private one, the litigants are in an unusu­
ally poor position to safeguard the integrity of the system. Examine 
again the original losing litigant with his three choices of p ayin g  the 
adverse judgment, pursuing an appeal, or seeking a s ettlement. The 
litigant ' s  private asses sment of the choices should lead the litigant to 
negotiate a settlement in almost every case .  If the adverse j udgment 
entails s ignificant collateral costs which may be avoided by vacatur, 
the l itigant will choos e  to condition that settlement on vacatur. The 
losing litigant has no incentive to defend the integrity of a judgment 
which he has lost,  yet, he has everything to gain by erasing that ad­
verse decision. 
Moreover, his adversary, the prevailing party, is  a poor de­
fender of the judgment because he will be able to obtain a higher 
overall outcome by settlement whenever his opponent places a high 
value on vacatur. Through the postjudgment s ettlement process ,  
the prevailing party i s  able t o  make use of the j udicial decision a s  if it  
were his own private property. 252 If  a prevailing party can accu­
rately identify adverse impacts of a judgment on the opponent in 
addition to the actual verdict, those impacts b ecome part of that 
party's  overall calculus of settlement .  
250 See id. (refusing t o  permit litigants t o  settle after oral argument conditioned on 
the court's agreement not to publish an opinion). The coun in Village Escrow explo.ined 
its refusal as foilows : 
!d. 
For, it would send a message to other appellants and respondents that 
they can wait until oral argument and, if they sense the probability or 
possibility the appellate court will rule against them, buy their way out of 
an unfavorable precedent often at the relatively cheap price asked by the 
single opponent they face in that appeal.  
25 1 Some may argue that the decision to settle after judgment must ,  perforce, result 
in societ;,l losses . Cf Fiss ,  supra note 8, at 1 089 (inherent conflict between viewing adju­
dication in private terms and public terms). No matter how the costs of Vi'.catur are 
distributed among society and the individual li tigants, one cost that can never be repaid 
is the value of the judicial resources consumed in arriving at the initial judgment. These 
resources are already expended and cannot be saved by a postjudgment settlement. See 
Kates & Barker, supra note 207 . at 1 433-35.  Thus, society's stake in the vacatur decision 
can be tied to the societal investment in obtaining the ini tial judgment. 
252 See Memoria! Hosp.  v. United States Dep' t  of Health & Human Servs., 862 F.2d 
i 299 ,  1 302 (7th Cir. 1988) .  
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To illustrate, suppose that Nestle could pursue its toll house 
litigation against ten different defendants and, if pursued indepen­
dently, the odds of winning were 40 % .  A successful defendant 
could conceivably hold Nes tle hos tage to the tune of approximately 
40% of the expected damages, minus litigation costs,  for agreeing 
to vacate an adverse decision. The firs t winning plaintiff appropri­
ates the public benefit-the cost savings of forgoing the subsequent 
nine litigations .  
This analysis  reveals an additional insight .  Rather than being a 
helpless captive to the other side's demands for vacatur in the 
postjudgment settlement negotiation, as suggested by the Nestle 
court, a prevailing litigant may be the beneficiary of the bargaining 
advantage afforded not simply by his win, but by the additional costs 
the j udgment imposes on the other side. A well-informed litigant 
should be able to negotiate a higher postjudgment settlement if he 
agrees to vacatur as a condition of settlement .  
CoNCLUSION 
Allowing vacatur to be resolved by settlement negotiation be­
tween the parties imposes tangible but frequently undetectable so­
cial cos ts . These costs include the public cost of forgoing the 
collateral estoppel and res judicata effects of the prior judgment. 
This cost is borne directly by third party liti gants but shared by the 
public interest in preventing duplicative and piecemeal l itigation. 
The costs also include the erasure of collateral consequences of an 
adverse judgment, the loss of precedential value for j udicial deci­
sion s ,  and a diminished respect for the judicial process .253 
Moreover, rather than encouraging the settlement process,  a j u­
dicial rule encouraging routine grants of vacatur disrupts the pro­
ces s .  A procedure which allows parties to obtain vacatur as a matter 
of right by conditioning a postj udgment settlement on vacatur will 
encourage parties to delay settlement until after trial because the 
effects of an adverse judgment can be avoided at little or no cost by 
postjudgment settlement .  The procedure will also permit  the pre­
vailing party to ob tain as a private windfall the public costs of vaca­
tur, and will place the defense of the integrity of j udicial decisions in 
253 The Village Escrow court recognized the substantial social cost inherent in permit­
ting lit igants to buy their way out of  unfavorable decisions . " [I]t  could even distort the 
law by allowing parties who possess ample means to prevent the filing of adverse prece­
dents while those without means are unable to do so ."  Village Escrow, 248 Cal .  Rptr. at 
696. The implication of this distortion is particularly acute in cases in which an institu­
tional defendant repeatedly litigates similar claims against  individual plaintiffs , such as 
cases in the mass tort/products liability area. 
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the hands of litigants who are not in a position to safeguard the pub­
lic values inherent therein . 
Accordingly, the settlement of a case pending appeal should 
not entitle the litigants to vacatur as a matter of right .  Rather, the 
courts should review motions to vacate with the presumption that 
vacatur is not an appropriate tool for erasing an unfavorable trial 
court decision . The standard motion to vacate after a postjudgment 
settlement, motivated solely by the losing party's  desire to avoi d  the 
collateral consequences of that j udgment, should be routinely de­
nied. Though the litigants should retain the opportunity to p er­
suade the court that there is particular prejudice in an individual 
case ,  such as the unfairness presented by the Munsingwear doctrine, 
the litigants should bear the burden of convincing the court that this 
dilemma is not of their own making .  Absent such a showing, the 
j udgment in a case which has been resolved through s ettlement 
should enjoy the same vitality as that in any other case in which the 
losing liti gant chooses not to appeal . 
